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Renewable fuels have been promoted as a climate solution as well as for their energy security and 
domestic economic benefits. Analysts often assume that, other than process emissions, biofuels emit 
no net CO2 because their biogenic carbon was recently absorbed from the atmosphere. This 
“renewability shortcut” has shaped both public perception and public policy to date. Cap-and-trade 
policies follow GHG inventory conventions that use the shortcut and so fail to properly account for 
biofuel emissions. They also miss portions of the upstream GHG emissions from fossil-based 
transportation fuels, although most such emissions are trade related. Lifecycle analysis (LCA), which 
attempts to account for all of the GHG impacts associated with fuel production, has been proposed 
as a means of regulating fuels for climate policy. LCA is used to qualify certain fuels for the U.S. 
federal renewable fuel standard (RFS) and also forms the basis of a low-carbon fuel standard 
(LCFS). However, as LCA system boundaries have expanded to address market effects such as 
induced land-use change, its application in policy has become controversial.  
This paper examines these issues, quantifies GHG emissions missed by cap-and-trade policies as 
commonly proposed, and identifies ways to address biofuel emissions in the context of a carbon cap 
that covers major emitting sectors. Resource economics suggests that policy should be defined by 
annual basis accounting of carbon stocks and flows and other GHG fluxes rather than by LCA. This 
perspective suggests the use of a three-part approach: (1) correct specification of the transportation 
sector point of regulation with careful carbon accounting at the point of finished fuel distribution; 
(2) voluntary fuel and feedstock GHG accounting standards to track CO2 uptake and uncapped 
GHG emissions throughout the fuel supply chain; and (3) a land protection fund for purchasing 
international forest carbon offsets to mitigate leakage. While an RFS can remain in place to drive 
volumes of specified fuels into the market, this approach avoids the need for either LCA 
requirements in the RFS or the added regulatory layer of an LCFS. Integrated into a cap-and-trade 
framework, this market-based approach would provide biofuel and feedstock production with a 
carbon price incentive tied to the cap, creating a more complete carbon management framework for 
the transportation fuels sector.  
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Addressing Biofuel GHG Emissions in the  
Context of  a Fossil-Based Carbon Cap 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Most national climate legislation includes transportation fuels under a GHG emissions cap by 
requiring refiners to submit allowances to cover the fossil carbon content of their products. By so 
serving as a point of regulation, refiners perform an accounting function on behalf of all actors 
(consumers, automakers, system planners and fuel suppliers) whose decisions collectively determine 
GHG emissions from the transportation sector.  
While having fuels in the cap is necessary for an effective climate policy, it is not sufficient for 
addressing all fuels-related emissions. In particular, it fails to cover many GHG emissions during the 
production of biofuels and their feedstocks. It also risks emissions leakages through the interlinked 
fuels and agricultural commodity markets that cross the boundaries of capped and uncapped sectors 
both domestically and internationally. Thus, the carbon accounting system under a fossil-based cap 
alone is incomplete when it comes to biofuels.  
This paper explores ways to close the gaps in cap-based emissions accounting for biofuels while 
mitigating the associated leakages. To remedy the situation without an additional layer of regulation, 
a cap-and-trade system can be refined through the following three-part approach:  
(1) Require refiners to submit allowances sufficient to cover the conventional fuel equivalent carbon 
content for the energy value of all transportation fuel distributed, regardless of fuel type, except 
to the extent it is rated as demonstrating lower net uncapped direct GHG emissions.  
(2) Establish Fuel and Feedstock Accounting Standards (FFAS) for rating fuels and feedstocks 
based on uncapped GHG emissions throughout their supply chains; while voluntary, FFAS ratings 
would provide a way to reduce refiners' allowance requirements as defined by Part (1).  
(3) Address market-mediated impacts (indirect GHG emissions versus those in the direct supply 
chain) through a Land Protection Fund (LPF) for purchasing international forest carbon offsets 
commensurate with induced fuels-related GHG emissions not otherwise accounted for.  
This approach would strengthen the robustness of a fossil-based carbon cap covering transportation 
fuels. Incentives for leakage are minimized by using a rigorous specification (Part 1) for allowance 
submission at the point of regulation, while the FFAS (Part 2) and LPF (Part 3) represent non-
regulatory complementary measures that fill gaps in fuel GHG accounting by tracking uncapped 
emissions and mitigating leakage. Coupling allowance submission requirements to the biofuel supply 
chain enables the cap to drive innovation, providing a cost-effective, technology-forcing policy for 
fuels. The effectiveness of this approach hinges on establishment of a GHG cap-and-trade system, 
into which the FFAS and LPF must be integrated to ensure environmental integrity.  
The renewability shortcut 
As commonly proposed, a fossil-based carbon cap excludes biogenic CO2 emissions, treating the 
CO2 reduction implied when substituting bio-based carbon for fossil carbon in fuels as fully 
additional. Aside from process emissions, the fact that the CO2 was recently recycled from the air 
through plant growth is assumed to mean that biofuel use emits no net CO2 over what would have 
been emitted if biofuel were not used. This "renewability shortcut" is, however, questionable. One 
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issue is that of the additionality: whether growing biofuel feedstocks absorbs more CO2 than would 
have otherwise occurred when cultivating plants for other purposes or leaving land to unmanaged 
("natural") plant growth. A related issue is emissions leakage: an effect tied to the economic coupling 
of biofuels from an uncapped sector substituting for fossil fuels in a capped sector. Questions 
include the extent of land displacement due to market linkages, including indirect land-use change 
that aggravates tropical deforestation and leads to a large release of stored carbon.  
These concerns have not been considered in either cap-and-trade proposals to date or in policies to 
promote biofuels through mandates and subsidies. Until recently, neither were they adequately 
considered in proposals to regulate fuels through lifecycle analysis. While comparing fuels according 
to "carbon footprint" has simplistic appeal, and such analysis can be expansive in scope (covering 
indirect land-use change and other secondary effects), it is unclear that lifecycle analysis provides an 
appropriate framework for regulation. Moreover, lifecycle accounting is not consistent with the fully 
additive annual basis carbon accounting needed to rigorously track GHG emissions under a cap, 
which is in turn necessary for the overall environmental integrity of any climate protection regime. 
This paper explores one approach for addressing biofuel-related emissions through mechanisms 
integrated into cap-and-trade policy rather than complementary policies that lack accounting 
consistency with the cap. An alternative approach (not explored here) might be to treat biofuels and 
other forms of bioenergy as offsets, that is, under rules governing how GHG reductions from 
uncapped sources are credited against capped sources.  
Emissions missed by a fossil-based cap 
To put the concerns about biofuel-related GHG emissions in context, the first section of this paper 
provides a background analysis that estimates ranges of emissions missed by a fossil-based carbon 
cap. Missed emissions include those that occur either domestically in uncapped sectors or overseas 
in countries that do not have carbon caps in place (i.e., most countries other than the European 
Union). The GHG emissions missed by a cap include not only those associated with biofuels, but 
also emissions associated with overseas production of petroleum fuels from both conventional and 
unconventional sources.  
Estimates are developed using a sketch model of U.S. transportation sector GHG emissions derived 
from recent editions of the Department of Energy (DOE) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO). The AEO 
projections for bio-based fuels under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and for international 
sources of petroleum and petroleum products were compared to a modified reference projection 
that reflects vehicle efficiency improvements only, without the apparent reductions that DOE 
projects using the renewability shortcut (i.e., excluding the biogenic carbon in fuels).  
Although uncertainties are large, estimates of biofuel emissions missed by a fossil-based cap range 
from 89–177 TgCO2e* in 2020, or roughly 5%–9% of a baseline level of 1,985 TgCO2e for U.S. 
transportation sector direct CO2 emissions in 2005. A greater quantity of missed emissions is tied to 
imported petroleum products, amounting to roughly 253 TgCO2e in 2020, including overseas 
emissions from both conventional refining and heavy crudes.  
Counting both biofuels and petroleum products, total transportation-related emissions missed by the 
cap range roughly 342–430 TgCO2e in 2020, or 17%–22% of sector's 2005 direct emissions. In 
other words, missed emissions are comparable in magnitude to the level of GHG reductions under 
consideration for that time frame. Note that even in 2005, 183–208 TgCO2e would have been 
                                                 
*Teragrams (Tg) CO2-equivalent, where 1 Tg (1012g) = 1 million metric tons (MMT).  Note that 1 TgCO2 = 44/12 
(3.667) TgC for comparison to values given on a carbon (rather than CO2) mass basis.  
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missed under a cap set at the 2005 level. The majority of these baseline missed emissions are from 
overseas refining of conventional petroleum (i.e., the emissions embodied in imports of gasoline and 
other petroleum fuels), which are not part of the U.S. GHG inventory.  
Toward carbon management for transportation fuels 
Including transportation fuels under a fossil-based carbon cap would put most of the sector's GHG 
emissions into a carbon management framework. The vast majority of sector emissions is CO2 from 
end-use fuel consumption. Measurement of these emissions is indirect, relying on tallies of fuel use 
(based on taxes and other commercial records), but accurate because fuel chemistry is well defined. 
Most GHG emissions at domestic refineries and other stationary sources associated with fuel supply, 
including emissions from fossil energy used for biofuel production, also fall under cap-based 
management. Although upstream emissions from imported fuels are missed by a U.S. domestic 
carbon cap, such emissions can be considered no different than those embodied in overseas 
production of other imports (such as steel, other metals and intermediates, durable goods, imported 
foods and fibers, and so on).  
The missed emissions associated with biofuels, however, entail special concerns because of the  
renewability shortcut. This problem can be considered one of incomplete information: lack of 
facility-specific data on uncapped emissions from the feedstock and fuel supply chain prevents the 
carbon market from addressing significant portions of biofuel-related emissions. In general, an 
information gap exists for all biofuel-related emissions other than those from purchased fossil 
energy already under the cap. The approach outlined here can be seen as a way to address this 
information barrier by specifying mechanisms to track and mitigate uncapped emissions. It thereby 
exposes biofuel and feedstock production and its associated impacts to the carbon price signal from 
the cap, creating a more complete carbon management framework for the sector.  
Because the set of concepts outlined here addresses only biofuel-related emissions, it potentially 
addresses 89–177 TgCO2e (26%–41%) of the total 342–430 TgCO2e of U.S. transportation fuels-
related emissions that this analysis suggests would be missed by a fossil-based carbon cap in 2020. 
However, essentially all of the remaining emissions are trade-related, being embodied in imported 
conventional fuel products. Other mechanisms will be needed to address those and the similar 
emissions associated with imported non-fuel products regardless of the approach taken for biofuels.  
Features of the approach outlined here 
This three-part approach addresses biofuels in the context of a fossil-based carbon cap covering 
transportation as part of an economy-wide program. As noted, it does not address "high-carbon" 
petroleum fuels. Neither does it address electricity and hydrogen, which would be handled by a cap's 
coverage of stationary sources where they are produced. A broader question not analyzed here is 
whether any form of bioenergy (as might be used to produce electricity and hydrogen) is properly 
treated under cap-and-trade or renewable energy policies that use the renewability shortcut.  
Regarding this paper's focus on biofuels, several features of the approach are worth highlighting:  
 Under this approach, the cap itself becomes the primary driver for GHG emissions 
reduction in the transportation fuel and feedstock supply chain.  
Rather than using a bottom-up, technology-based regulation such as a LCFS, innovations in fuel 
production would be driven in a top-down, market-based manner based on their value for avoiding 
allowance costs. Crucial for market integrity is the Part (1) stipulation that allowances be submitted 
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to cover the direct (chemical) carbon content of all distributed fuel on a conventional fuel (gasoline 
or diesel) energy-equivalent basis unless the fuel is otherwise rated using the FFAS.  
 The point of regulation (POR) for covering fuels under the cap must be the point of 
finished fuel product distribution, not the refinery gate as commonly proposed to date.  
Only at such a point (which is already used for fuels regulation under the Clean Air Act) is it possible 
to fully account for the GHG impacts of all fuels and fuel components that reach the market. While 
some economists may assert that the POR should be as upstream as possible, such a view reflects 
poor knowledge of real-world markets, particularly the transportation fuels market, where complete 
allowance and credit reconciliation must be done at locations sufficiently downstream to track all 
components of fuels that ultimately reach retail outlets.  
 This approach holds unrated biofuels competitively harmless against conventional fuels.  
Because refiners submit allowances for only the conventional fuel carbon equivalent of biofuel 
unless its voluntary FFAS rating shows otherwise, the relative pricing of a biofuel compared to a 
conventional fuel for which it substitutes would be the same as it is without climate policy in place. 
While a carbon cap will impact differently the production costs of different biofuels, their value in 
the motor fuel market does not change unless they are rated using the FFAS.  
 This approach need not replace the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which can remain 
in place as a separate program to drive volumes of specified fuels into the market.  
The RFS mandates 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2022. Depending on its composition, that 
would comprise 9%–13% of the 260 billion gallons gasoline-equivalent transportation fuel demand 
then projected after vehicle efficiency gains. Although the RFS limits GHG intensity for portions of 
its mandated volume, it leaves GHG emissions uncontrolled for the vast majority (roughly 90%) of 
U.S. transportation fuel. With the three-part approach outlined here operating under a carbon cap, 
the RFS would not be needed for controlling GHG emissions. It could remain in place to promote 
renewable fuels for reasons of energy security and economic development.  
 Use of the FFAS is voluntary, but rigorous accounting for fuels under the cap will create 
an incentive for fuel and feedstock providers to rate their products using the FFAS.  
Because FFAS ratings are data driven and facility specific, controversies due to disputable modeling 
assumptions can be minimized. While initially only producers with verifiably low-GHG production 
would rate their products, opportunities for market-driven growth in low-carbon fuel and feedstock 
production practices will motivate innovations that can be rewarded only through use of the ratings. 
Because no GHG reduction credit is given for unrated products, a voluntary FFAS program also 
avoids the need for explicit grandfathering.  
 Although informed by lifecycle analysis, FFAS rating differs from it in important ways.  
FFAS is facilities-based rather than product-based in that the basic unit of accounting is a facility 
(farm, forest, biorefinery, etc.) where feedstock and fuels are produced. It treats facilities as "black 
boxes" and so reporting a FFAS rating entails only a tally of GHG fluxes across the facility system 
boundary. There is no need to characterize the processes used by various facilities or to develop 
detailed analyses for multiplicities of feedstock-fuel "pathways" as defined by fuel cycle modelers 
and applied in lifecycle-based regulations such as an LCFS. The FFAS rating depends strictly on 
verifiable data, or facility-specific modeling based on local data, from the actual fuel or feedstock 
supply chain. If one element changes (e.g., if feedstock is sourced differently), then the FFAS rating 
will change (or be lost, for example, if an unrated feedstock is substituted for a rated feedstock).  
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Also, the FFAS is a protocol designed to track CO2 uptake and uncapped GHG emissions for 
reconciliation with the cap while avoiding both missed emissions and double counting. In feedstock 
production, for example, a credit is given for additional CO2 absorbed by the growing biomass; that 
value is debited by N2O from fertilizer use but not debited for CO2 emissions from purchased fuels 
that are otherwise under the cap. Allocation among co-products will be needed as will procedures to 
avoid double crediting with offsets programs.  
 This approach would establish a market-based GHG management system that does not 
entail or require explicit comparisons of fuels.  
Because FFAS ratings and the carbon cap address production facilities where GHG emissions occur 
rather than end products, and rely on facilities data rather than assumed processes, policy makers 
need not put themselves in the position of judging different fuels or fuel pathways as "clean" (or 
"dirty") relative to others. While those inclined to think of products as clean or otherwise may find 
the lack of comparisons discomfiting, such product comparisons are not necessary under a GHG 
management paradigm that targets production-related emissions at locations where they occur rather 
than at the point of product distribution. Transportation fuels are traditionally fungible and fairly 
undifferentiated commodities. It is unclear that differentiating fuels with a product-based metric is as 
important as the ultimate product price, which would reflect carbon pricing of feedstocks and other 
process inputs due to their coupling to the carbon market through the FFAS.  
The FFAS rating will immediately (e.g., within an annual reporting period) reflect actual emissions, 
including the impacts of operational innovations of any type as well as changes in purchased inputs 
and other variables. The GHG mitigation value of bio-based fuels and feedstocks is then reflected in 
their price, which is in turn based on the reduction in allowance submission requirements 
determined by the difference between their net uncapped emissions and those of their fossil fuel or 
fossil feedstock equivalents. Such an approach is also consistent with the fact that it is the stationary 
source emissions associated with production that should be the object of attention rather than the 
products themselves, which can be physically identical regardless of how they are produced (e.g., 
corn ethanol is the same chemical as cellulosic ethanol).  
 The Land Protection Fund (LPF) would use the same specifications as proposed for 
international forest carbon programs, drawing on the extensive policy development work 
that has already gone into prescribing requirements for high-quality offsets.  
Unlike general offsets programs, the quantity of offsets purchased would not be just left up to the 
market. Rather, the LPF would purchase the quantity needed to fully mitigate the leakage linked to 
fuels. That quantity would be determined through analyses similar to those being used to assign an 
indirect land-use change value in lifecycle-based regulation. For funding a LPF, a variety of options 
can be identified that will need to be explored in subsequent discussions of this concept.  
A low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS) has been proposed to address the limitations of, or to replace, 
inclusion of fuels in the cap. The approach outlined here avoids the added regulatory layer of a 
LCFS, focusing instead on ways to make the cap itself more effective.  
In summary, the concepts introduced here are applicable for designing market-based policy to limit 
emissions and motivate technology change in the transportation fuels sector. Further analysis and 
discussion are needed to assess whether this approach can be developed into an effective, equitable 
and efficient policy for handling biofuels in the context of an economy-wide carbon cap.    
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Limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to levels low enough to avoid the most dangerous 
impacts of global warming is a challenge for all nations and all sectors of an economy. Many recent 
U.S. climate policy proposals seek to limit emissions to 20% or less of current levels by mid-century. 
Attaining such a goal is not possible without greatly reducing the net global warming impact of 
energy supply, which is today largely fossil-based. Reducing demand, whether by energy efficiency or 
by changing structural factors that underpin demand, is also crucial, and developing measures to 
cost-effectively and equitably accomplish such changes is a longstanding challenge of energy policy. 
The challenge for the transportation sector is as daunting as any.  
Because the cumulative atmospheric GHG burden must be controlled to limit damage to the 
climatic system, the path of annual emissions is just as crucial as the long-term target. Moreover, 
U.S. targets must be considered in the context of a cumulative global carbon budget. International 
policy is necessary and effective mechanisms must account for the interconnected nature of the 
global economy. Thus, policies must consider emissions leakages and induced effects, particularly 
changes in the biosphere, that can affect cumulative net GHG emissions for many years.  
For perspective, estimated total U.S. GHG emissions were 7,260 Tg* in 2005; net emissions were 
roughly 6,400 Tg after accounting for domestic land-use change and forestry sinks.1 Figure A-1 
(appendix) gives a breakdown of the U.S. GHG inventory with an additional level of disaggregation 
for the transportation sector, which accounted for 28% of U.S. GHG emissions in 2005. As 
commonly conceived, a GHG ("carbon") cap would cover the majority of the inventory and seek to 
progressively limit emissions by requiring entities in capped sectors to hold and redeem emissions 
allowances, the total of which cannot exceed the cap over a given compliance period.  
Policy context 
For the transportation sector, U.S. energy policy to date has largely relied on policies to expand and 
secure access to oil supplies, improve vehicle fuel efficiency, and promote the development and use 
of alternative fuels. Extensions of these policies form the basis for most thinking on transportation-
climate policy.2 From an environmental protection perspective, however, such approaches have 
limitations. Quantitatively, this can be seen in the gap that remains between the GHG emissions 
levels implied by recently adopted energy policies and the levels needed for climate protection. 
Figure 1 (next page) compares two forecasts of U.S. fossil-related CO2 emissions, before and after 
the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA 2007), to a capped emissions path leading to a 
CO2 emissions level in 2050 that is 83% lower than the 2005 level.3 This chart is meant merely to be 
illustrative and so it shows only CO2 emissions, not all greenhouse gases (CO2 was 84% of total U.S. 
CO2-equivalent GHG emissions in 2005).  
Alternative fuels policies have evolved into policies for promoting new fuels through regulation of 
full fuel cycle GHG impacts. Such approaches use lifecycle analysis (LCA) to discriminate fuels, as 
recently adopted for California's Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) and proposed federally in the 
EISA Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which prescribes LCA-based GHG reduction thresholds for 
various categories of fuel. Although LCA requirements represent a marked departure from 
traditional approaches to environmental regulation, many policymakers seem comfortable with the 
simple-sounding notion of regulating fuels by lifecycle GHG impact (or "carbon footprint" as it is 
                                                 
*GHG emissions are given here in teragrams (Tg) CO2-equivalent; 1 Tg (1012g) = 1 million metric tons (MMT).  
Note that 1 TgCO2 = 44/12 (3.667) TgC for comparison to values on a carbon (rather than CO2) basis.  
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colloquially called). In its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the RFS, the Environmental 
Protection Agency notes that, "To EPA’s knowledge, the GHG reduction thresholds presented in 
EISA are the first lifecycle GHG performance requirements included in federal law."4 LCA-based 
regulation is sweeping in its claims for effectiveness because at least in theory, it accounts for all 
relevant impacts, e.g., as seen in its EISA definition (below). Although the literature on LCA results 
for fuels is extensive, the literature on LCA as a literal basis for policy is actually quite limited.5  
Cap-and-trade, in contrast to LCA, focuses on discretely measurable emissions from specific 
sources, using what can be termed annual basis carbon ("ABC") accounting protocols, and is 
designed to capture the majority of emissions while recognizing that measurement challenges and 
other considerations may rule out complete coverage. Most cap-and-trade proposals follow U.S. 
EPA GHG inventory conventions in covering major stationary and mobile sources. The resulting 
tally includes the majority of fossil-based CO2 emitted during energy consumption (see Figure A-1). 
Excluded are industrial feedstocks and non-fossil emissions from agriculture and forestry. A fossil-
based cap covers emissions from energy that agricultural users purchase from covered sectors, such 
as electricity and fossil fuel emissions above specified thresholds. But it does not cover, for example, 
nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions or the CO2 associated with changes in soil management and land-use. 
Moreover, the direct, inventory-based ABC accounting used to implement a cap is strictly static, 
including neither economically induced effects nor temporal effects that might reflect (perhaps on a 
discounted basis) future GHG fluxes.  
Cap-based policy seeks to manage and limit GHG emissions through a carbon accounting system 
using allowance tracking and transactions, resulting in an economically efficient system.6 Including 
transportation fuels under the cap is necessary for the integrity of an economy-wide program 
Figure 1.   Recent projections of U.S. fossil CO2 emissions compared to climate-
protection targets such as those proposed by Obama Administration 
 
Source:  EPA (2008); EIA (2008a, b); climate protection targets are an interpolation of reductions below the 
2005 level by 14% in 2020 and by 83% in 2050 (shown as circles on green curve), allowing emissions 
to rise through 2010 at 1.2% per year (average 1990-2005 rate derived from EPA 2008).   
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because the sector's emissions are too large to leave unconstrained. However, it is not sufficient 
because of the complex nature of the multiple markets that comprise the sector. While this paper 
does not review all of the reasons why complementary policies are needed for transportation,7 one 
major concern is that fossil-based cap misses a substantial portion of emissions, particularly from 
biofuels. Although similar issues arise for electricity and gaseous fuels derived from biomass, this 
paper focuses on liquid biofuels and biomass-based feedstocks used to produce liquid fuels.  
Biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel have been promoted in the United States, Brazil, Europe and 
elsewhere as a solution to problems associated with the dependence of transportation on petroleum 
fuels. Biofuels also have policy support due to the economic benefits their production offers to rural 
communities. Because they are considered renewable, that is, able to be replenished on an ongoing 
basis as opposed to depleted like fossil fuels, biofuels have also enjoyed political support as part of a 
vision for a "sustainable," "energy independent," or "fossil-free" energy future.  
The renewability shortcut 
A common premise regarding renewable biomass-based energy resources is that, because of its 
recent biogenic origin, CO2 from their combustion does not cause a net increase in atmospheric 
GHG concentrations. Although the net energy and emissions impacts of biofuels have long been 
debated, official GHG inventories as well as most energy and climate models use this "renewability 
shortcut," the simplifying assumption that biofuels per se emit no net direct CO2 emissions.8 In this 
context, direct means emissions from the point of combustion or other end-use process that releases 
CO2 derived from the molecular (chemical) carbon contained in the fuel itself.  
In addition to the combustion emissions from a renewable fuel, biogenic CO2 is emitted in other 
ways, such as the CO2 released during fermentation of sugars into alcohol. Some biofuels, such as 
fatty acid methyl ester (FAME) biodiesel, may contain both biogenic and fossil carbon if some of 
their inputs are fossil derived. Other processes can involve direct or indirect biogenic CO2 emissions 
and significant portions of biogenic carbon end up in non-fuel co-products, such as feed 
components. Although lifecycle models often tally biogenic carbon internally by computing biofuel 
combustion CO2 and then netting it out by an assumed equal CO2 uptake, this approach still leaves 
out biogenic CO2 emissions as far as results are concerned and conveniently enables analysts to 
avoid  complete tracking of biogenic CO2 regardless of its form and fate.  
The renewability shortcut has shaped policy analysis and thinking to date.9 Both traditional lifecycle 
analysis (LCA) approaches (as proposed for fuels GHG regulation) and requirements for GHG 
emissions allowance tracking (as proposed for cap-and-trade policy) use it and so exclude direct CO2 
emissions from biofuels. For example, EPA states that its tailpipe emissions values for ethanol 
exclude CO2 emissions, "as these are assumed to be offset by feedstock carbon uptake," in its 
analysis for the proposed RFS rule.10 Figure 2 (next page) illustrates the situation, comparing the 
system boundaries as used in full fuel cycle models such as GREET for a fossil fuel and a biofuel.11 
This shortcut implicitly assumes that the CO2 reduction due to substituting a biofuel for a fossil fuel 
is completely additional and incurs no leakage in a carbon accounting sense.12 An action claimed to 
reduce GHG emissions is additional if it truly yields net GHG reduction over and above what would 
have occurred if the action were not taken. Leakage is a shift of emissions to another location (or 
time) that negates some or all of the GHG reductions an action claims to achieve.  
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Carbon accounting issues for fuels 
For a fossil fuels, lifecycle analysis uses a complete, intact "well-to-wheels" system boundary as far as 
direct effects are concerned. For biofuels, however, the system boundary effectively excludes the 
"wheels" even though it is still called "well- (or field-) to-wheels" analysis. As also shown in Figure 2, 
another gap in the system boundary is for biogenic CO2 released during biofuel production (e.g., in 
fermentation or combustion of biomass for process heat). The CO2 that enters the system through 
absorption during photosynthesis by growing biomass is, of course, the initial gap in the system 
boundary on which the shortcut is premised.  
A problem with this premise is the fact that land for growing either bioenergy feedstocks or any use 
of biomass (food, feed, fiber, forest products, etc.) is globally finite. Moreover, "unused" land -- land 
that is largely untouched, fallow or reverting to a "natural" (non-human-managed) state, and 
particularly unused land suitable for agriculture or forestry -- would most likely be otherwise 
occupied by growing plants and therefore absorbing carbon anyway. Globally speaking, a net benefit 
of avoided atmospheric CO2 buildup exists only if additional net absorption occurs over the entire 
biosphere. However, this is unlikely to be the case because scientific assessments clearly indicate that 
Figure 2.  System boundaries as commonly defined for transportation fuels lifecycle 
analysis and GHG inventories 
N.B. This diagram is deliberately simplified to highlight key factors for discussion. A full depiction of GHG fluxes 
would need to address many other details including soil carbon and N2O, co-products and other inputs/outputs of 
both bio- and fossil-based fuel production.  
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on a global basis land-use change, mainly tropical deforestation, is a large net source of emissions, 
contributing roughly 20% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions.13  
Recognizing these facts means that the CO2 reductions implied by using the renewability shortcut 
are not fully additional. Moreover, even if they appear additional on a local basis, leakage from 
economically induced effects may prevent the reductions from being fully additional on a global 
basis. Leakage can occur anytime a climate mitigation policy is incomplete either spatially or 
temporally.14 The question is therefore about the extent to which net GHG emissions are reduced 
when diverting some of the growing biomass -- which would soon see its recently absorbed carbon 
returned to the atmosphere as CO2 via metabolism or other energy-releasing process -- to displace 
fossil fuel as a source of energy.  
While the focus here is on the problems it raises for climate policy, this same concern is closely 
related to the "food vs. fuel" debate that follows from the ripple effect created by the integration of 
the global agricultural and energy sectors, for which biofuels provide one but not the only nexus.15 
The renewability shortcut also poses problems when attempting to apply analyses that use it for the 
design of regulations or market incentives that match accountability for fuel-related GHG emissions 
to parties who have the most control over different aspects of the emissions.  
The same problem arises in official projections of energy-related CO2 emissions, such as those given 
in DOE's Annual Energy Outlook, which also excludes biogenic carbon from its tallies. The result is a 
potentially misleading picture of inferred GHG emissions reductions. The renewability shortcut also 
presents a challenge for reconciling biofuel GHG emissions with a carbon cap in a manner that will 
not just "account for" emissions, but will in fact ensure that any assumed reductions are additional 
while avoiding barriers of incomplete information and providing the supply chain accountability 
needed for a well-functioning carbon market. Since it is not possible to establish a global carbon 
management policy all at once, the challenge is that of how to appropriately reward locally efficient 
GHG reduction options, such as biofuels might be, in a way that does not create perverse incentives 
because of incomplete global accounting.  
Indirect GHG emissions impacts 
A key issue is that of how to handle indirect or economically induced GHG emissions which fall 
outside of a supply chain that is traceable through specific commercial transactions. In Figure 2, 
indirect impacts are shown with a dotted boundary line. While real, such emissions represent effects 
outside the direct control of most if not all entities in a fuel supply chain. Therefore, questions of 
attribution and responsibility arise that have led to ongoing discussions regarding how public policy 
should handle indirect impacts.  
However indirect effects are handled, comparing fuels according to their lifecycle impacts "requires 
a clear and consistent definition of the system boundary both in terms of geography as well as the 
scope of effects that are compared."16 While such effects have been highlighted for biofuels, 
petroleum fuels also have indirect effects, including the GHG emissions during oil exploration and 
associated land-use impacts, deforestation and opening up of forested areas due to road and pipeline 
construction land, market effects from co-products such as residual oils and asphalts, as well as the 
emissions from military activity to protect and secure petroleum supplies.  
For biofuels, the induced impact of greatest concern is indirect land-use change (ILUC). When a 
biomass feedstock is grown on arable land, it competes with land used for other purposes including 
forest and grassland that is holding carbon. Increased demand for agricultural production -- whether 
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for foodstuff, livestock feed or biofuel -- raises commodity prices, which in turn stimulates 
conversion of additional land to agricultural production.17 The induced land-use change can occur in 
areas remote from the source of demand and similar effects can occur when withdrawing land from 
production, as in conservation reserve programs. Although the chain of effects can be complex and 
quite indirect, of particular concern is the impact on tropical forests which are under ongoing 
pressure for numerous reasons related to population and income growth.18 Loss of forest and other 
cover vegetation and soil disturbance during land conversion cause a substantial release of carbon to 
the atmosphere. Globally, such deforestation and forest degradation (largely in the tropics) account 
for roughly 20% of anthropogenic GHG emissions.19  
The issue of trade-offs in land use and their net impact on GHG emissions is profound. Arable land 
is a limited resource and the ecological benefits -- including carbon sequestration -- of native forests 
and grasslands are substantial. Therefore, a major challenge for GHG mitigation policy is balancing 
the global use of land as protected ecosystems against its use for producing biomass to displace 
fossil fuels.20 Achieving this balance will require careful consideration of the circumstances of land 
use and agricultural production. An implication is that climate policy should be designed to reward 
the most beneficial uses of land from a net GHG limitation perspective, which practically speaking 
can only be evaluated within the broader context of the many other factors that shape energy, 
agricultural and land-use policy both domestically and globally.  
Both the RFS as expanded by EISA (2007) and the LCFS as promulgated by CARB (2009) require 
significant indirect impacts to be addressed. For purposes of qualifying categories of renewable fuel 
other than those from existing facilities, EISA specifies the following definition:  
(H) LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS.—The term ‘lifecycle greenhouse gas 
emissions’ means the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including 
direct emissions and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from 
land use changes), as determined by the Administrator, related to the full fuel 
lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from 
feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery and use of 
the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all greenhouse 
gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming potential.21  
As of this writing, however, the climate bill currently pending in Congress (ACESA 2009) proposes 
to exclude overseas ILUC from the RFS regulations, stipulating:  
‘‘(A) EXCLUSION FROM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS REGARDING LIFECYCLE 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS.—Notwithstanding the definition of ‘lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions’ in paragraph (1)(H), for purposes of determining whether 
the fuel meets a definition in paragraph (1) or complies with paragraph 10 (2)(A)(i), 
the Administrator shall exclude emissions from indirect land use changes outside the 
renewable fuel’s feedstock’s country of origin.22  
ACESA then calls for a National Academy of Sciences study to assess issues related to the indirect 
GHG emissions impacts of transportation fuels, followed by a joint EPA-USDA determination of 
whether and how such impacts should be addressed in the RFS regulation.  
The Executive Order establishing the California LCFS stipulated that it "…shall be measured on a 
full fuel cycle basis… ."23 Although this instruction is not as specific as the federal law, CARB has 
broad discretion over how to develop its authorized regulations. The LCFS implementation 
 
7 
proposal cites the EISA definition and other considerations in electing to include indirect impacts 
when calculating lifecycle-based Carbon Intensity (CI) values for fuels. CARB states that it identified 
only one indirect effect that generates significant quantities of GHGs, specifically land-use change 
effects "triggered by a significant increase in the demand for a crop-based biofuel."24  
This paper does not address the ILUC issue in the context of regulatory policies that use lifecycle 
analysis such as the RFS or LCFS. Instead, it examines other mechanisms for addressing indirect 
impacts, namely, a more careful specification of allowance submissions requirements for fuels under 
a cap and a Land Protection Fund. The rationale is that because ILUC is economically induced at a 
global ("macro") level, it might be best addressed by an approach that also operates at a macro level, 
using a cap-based market mechanism to minimize the adverse economic signal and create a price 
signal that counter-balances the remaining biofuel-related price pressures causing the land-use 
changes of concern, particularly tropical deforestation.  
Overview of paper 
Some of the emissions associated with biofuel production are included in traditional inventory-based 
modeling but others are not. Emissions from purchased fossil fuels used in growing biomass 
feedstocks and in biorefining are tallied in their respective supply (e.g., electricity) or end-use (e.g., 
diesel fuel) sectors. Agricultural emissions of N2O and CH4 are tallied in that portion of the EPA 
inventory, but are not reflected in the fossil-CO2 only emissions reported in the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook. However, indirect emissions are not tallied in either 
place, and neither are direct emissions associated with upstream processes that might occur overseas 
for either fossil or biofuels.  
The Background Analysis section of this paper reviews available information in order to characterize 
the emissions likely to be missed under carbon-cap policies as proposed to date. The bottom line is 
that emissions reductions as appear to be projected by EIA (as seen in the "post-EISA" curve of 
Figure 1) are not an accurate reflection of total impacts because they fail to reflect all of the GHG 
emissions associated with transportation fuel use.  
The balance of the paper then explores whether a set of policy mechanisms can be defined that 
retains the power of a cap-driven market while sufficiently addressing emissions missed by a fossil-
based cap. If such mechanisms can be defined, it may not be necessary to rely on an additional 
regulatory program, and an integrated policy approach might then both provide effective GHG 
management and drive beneficial technology change in transportation fuels in a manner consistent 
with limiting GHG emissions to climate-protective levels.  
BACKGROUND ANALYSIS  
To fully examine the extent of transportation fuel-related GHG emissions missed by a fossil-based 
cap would entail parsing out capped vs. uncapped emissions throughout the fuel lifecycle, with 
attribution to potentially regulated entities as opposed to the stylized fuels production pathways on 
which LCA models are based. That task would be a challenging for a variety of reasons. One is 
simply that GHG emissions from fuel production are not yet regulated and the requisite reporting is 
not in place. Moreover, available information is largely based on LCA methods whose analytic 
foundations were never really designed for emissions tracking,25 but rather were based on process 
energy utilization models that entail multilayered assumptions and report aggregate results for 
abstract production pathways. Such results are difficult to disentangle for addressing the questions 
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posed here.26 Nevertheless, available information and a review of results from existing fuel lifecycle 
analyses enable construction of a sketch model of the situation.  
Thus, this analysis approximates the GHG magnitudes involved by using a simplified model of U.S. 
transportation energy use in order to help think through options for coupling a fossil carbon cap to 
the transportation fuels sector. Working from recent editions of EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), 
which projects energy use and direct, fossil-only CO2 emissions through 2030, a range of estimates 
for the relative magnitude of emissions missed by a cap is given in Table 1. For ease in conveying 
relative importance, the table normalizes transportation sector direct CO2 emissions to their 2005 
level, so that the value 100 scales to the 1,985 TgCO2 (annual) estimated for 2005 by EIA.27 Figure 3 
shows AEO projections with the scaling levels and historical data since 1990.  
Transportation sector CO2 emissions 
Table 1 summarizes the relative magnitudes of emissions missed by a cap under various 
assumptions; a tabulation of absolute emissions levels is given in the appendix for reference. The 
first line (A) of Table 1 lists hypothetical targets for the sector proportional to economy-wide cap 
targets similar to those articulated in President Obama's 2009 budget proposal.28 Although a market-
based national climate policy would dictate only economy-wide, not sector-specific targets, 
proportionality is a useful point of reference for comparing how well sector policies limit emissions 
relative to economy-wide targets and timetables.  
The second line (B) gives a business-as-usual (BAU) trend estimated without recently enacted energy 
policies such as vehicle efficiency standards and the RFS. This BAU case (also plotted in Figure 3) 
accounts for a near-term slowdown in economic growth and also reflects the EIA's recent, 
substantial upward assumptions for future world oil prices. Compared to the AEO 2008 average of 
Figure 3.  U.S. transportation sector end-use CO2 emissions with business-as-usual 
(BAU) projection compared to EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2009,  
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$57 per barrel, AEO 2009 projects an average $108 per barrel for the 2010-2030 period. Line B 
reflects impacts on travel demand but not on vehicle efficiency (which is given in Line C). Even 
without efficiency gains, growth in transportation sector direct CO2 emissions is relatively slow 
(1.1% per year) compared to earlier projections, reaching levels of 111 by 2020 and 130 by 2030 
relative to a 2005 level of 100.  
The third line (C) of the table reflects the projected impact of vehicle efficiency improvements, due 
to both Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and higher fuel prices, but not the 
RFS. This case is derived from AEO 2009 energy use projections while assuming a fixed 
transportation fuel end-use carbon intensity, i.e., backing out the reduction in carbon intensity 
implied by EIA's failure to count renewable fuel emissions in the transportation sector tally. The 
result is that efficiency gains alone hold growth in transportation sector direct, fossil-only CO2 
emissions to 5% above the 2005 level by 2020 and 14% by 2030, for an average 2005-2030 growth 
rate of 0.5% per year.  
Line D provides the relative CO2 emissions levels corresponding to EIA's actual AEO 2009 
projections (EIA 2008b), including both efficiency gains and the displacement of petroleum fuels by 
renewable fuels under the RFS. Based EIA's projections, actual renewable fuel use reaches only 
Table 1. Sketch model of U.S. transportation sector GHG emissions missed by a cap 
 
Line Scenario 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
A Cap targets (similar to Obama administration's)  100 --  86 57
B BAU trend (fixed vehicle efficiency) 93 100 100 111 130
C Vehicle efficiency gains only (CAFE, etc.) 100 100 105 114
D Apparent emissions, as projected by DOE  100 96 98 105
 Reductions from biofuels      
E    apparent  [C-D] 4.0 6.1 9.0
F    actual  - Low emissions case  [(1-L)*E]   0.3 1.6 3.0
                - High emissions case   -3.5 -2.8 -3.0
G Actual emissions  - Low  [C-F]   100 103 111
                             - High   103 107 117
H Biofuel emissions missed by cap  - Low  [G-D]   3.7 4.5 6.0
 - High   7.4 8.9 12.0
I Imported refined products  6 5 4 4
J Imported heavy crudes  3 5 8 11
K Total emissions missed by cap   - Low  [H+I+J]   13 17 21
  - High   17 22 27
L Biofuel GHGs relative to conventional fuel      
 Low GHG intensity    0.94 0.73 0.67
 High GHG intensity    1.87 1.47 1.34
Source:  Derived from DOE (EIA) AEO 2008 and 2009, Table A18, normalized so that the 2005 level  = 100, 
for transportation sector direct CO2 emissions; see Table A-1 in appendix of this paper for details.  
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about 28 billion gallons by 2022, equivalent to 30 billion gallons in terms of RFS credits and so short 
of the 36 billion gallon mandate.29 It grows over the remainder of that decade so that by 2030 
renewable fuel use reaches 36 billion gallons (projected actual volume, corresponding to 39 billion 
RFS credits). These RFS volumes result in an apparent decrease in transportation sector CO2 
emissions to below the 2005 level over 2010-2020 and then small growth to a relative level of 105 by 
2030, as shown in Line D of Table 1 and AEO'09 curve in Figure 3.  
We characterize the emissions reductions implied in Line D as apparent, in contrast to EIA's 
unqualified reporting of significant CO2 emissions reductions due to a shift "to fuels that are less 
carbon-intensive or carbon neutral."30 As in EPA's GHG inventory, EIA's use of the "renewability 
shortcut" omits most biofuel emissions from their transportation sector tabulations and so assumes 
that the CO2 emissions reduction from replacing fossil carbon by biogenic carbon is fully additional. 
Although emissions from fossil fuels used in biofuels production are counted in EIA's overall fossil 
CO2 tallies across sectors (including, e.g., diesel fuel for farming biofuel feedstocks), non-fossil CO2 
GHG impacts are not counted and neither are any overseas leakage or indirect effects.  
Nevertheless, these apparent reductions still leave transportation CO2 emissions at a level higher 
than the illustrative climate-protective levels such as those in Table 1, Line A. (Again, this illustration 
is not meant to suggest proportional targets across sectors, but only to suggest the limitations of 
existing energy policies for addressing climate.) It should also be kept in mind that energy forecasts 
often change greatly from year to year, as seen in the marked changes from EIA's final, post-EISA 
AEO 2008 to its early release AEO 2009 projections. This forecasting variability is tied to varying 
assumptions about future economic growth, energy resources and market volatility.  
Biofuel emissions missed by a cap  
As remarked above, it is difficult to disentangle capped from uncapped emissions in published 
analyses of GHG emissions from biofuels. However, it is possible to make a rough approximation 
of  the range of emissions not accounted for under the transportation sector as typically tallied under 
cap-and-trade proposals. Some of the most significant emissions not covered by cap accounting are 
also the most uncertain. This concern applies both to direct emissions in a biofuel supply chain, such 
as N2O from farm fields, and to indirect emissions outside of the supply chain, such as carbon 
fluxes from land-use change. Although such issues are very different, they both result in large 
uncertainties that would remain even with a more detailed analysis.  
Line E of Table 1 gives the "apparent" emissions reduction from the RFS-driven expansion of 
biofuels use. It is the difference between the level scaled to EIA projections (D) and the level 
calculated on the basis of vehicle efficiency improvements alone (C). Relative to the 2005 reference 
level of 100, apparent reductions from the RFS amount to 4 in 2010 and rise to 9 in 2030. The 9 
unit reduction represents 36% of the apparent total CO2 reduction of 25 in 2030.  
To illustrate the possible magnitude of missed emissions, we use a low-high range of assumed 
biofuels GHG intensity. Strictly speaking, this mixes lifecycle accounting with cap accounting. Given 
the uncertainties involved, however, the portion of lifecycle emissions captured by a cap (partly in 
other sectors) is likely to be counterbalanced, if not more than counterbalanced, by the large high-
end uncertainty in uncapped emissions that some of the literature suggests are underestimated by 
most lifecycle tallies (including both N2O as well as land-use change).31 Any such assumptions 
admittedly beg the question of how such lifecycle analysis should be done and how it should be 
applied. However, the objective here is not to weigh in on how to craft LCA-based regulation, but 
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rather to characterize the emissions accounting problem in the context of a carbon cap for the 
purpose of exploring mechanisms to address the gaps.  
Lines L at the bottom of the table give lifecycle biofuel GHG intensity relative to petroleum fuel. 
The Low values are based on a straightforward application of the RFS lifecycle requirements to the 
mix of biofuel projected by EIA (2008b). These intensity values assume that, on average, 
"grandfathered" ethanol32 has the same GHG intensity as gasoline and that compliance with the RFS 
lifecycle requirements is based on traditional fuel cycle analysis modeling assumptions. As projected 
volumes of cellulosic and other advanced biofuels increase, the projected GHG intensity of the 
supplied biofuel mixed declines, reaching an estimated level of 0.67 (33% average reduction in 
lifecycle GHG emissions) by 2030.  
For an illustrative High emissions range, we simply double the Low values. In this case even by 2030 
the net GHG intensity of biofuels remains higher than that of conventional petroleum fuels 
(meaning fuels from conventional oil, not from high-carbon fossil resources). This pessimistic 
picture is broadly consistent with those studies that suggest that any purpose-grown energy crops 
(including highly efficient ones) fail to yield net GHG reductions that are truly additional on a global 
basis in light of the constraints on productive land even with ongoing increases in yield. These High 
values illustrate a rough magnitude of impacts if compliance with the RFS lifecycle GHG emissions 
requirements fails to reflect real-world emissions by a wide margin.33 Again, the purpose here is only 
to illustrate how the disparate views on biofuel emissions affect the range of emissions missed by a 
GHG cap based on fuels' fossil-carbon content alone. A combination of technological progress (e.g., 
making fuel from wastes34) and effective GHG management throughout the supply chain might 
offer a less pessimistic outcome.  
Lines G provides a range of adjusted estimates of actual relative U.S. transportation sector GHG 
emissions impacts; these estimates can be considered as giving a more complete picture than the 
EIA projections of Line D. Only missed biofuel-related emissions are included in these impacts, 
which include any overseas component of ILUC but do not include any conventional upstream 
emissions either domestically or overseas. As shown in the Low-High range of Lines G, emissions 
do not fall below the 2005 level and by 2030 range from 11%–17% higher than the 2005 level, 
rather than just 5% higher as projected by EIA.  
Upstream fossil emissions missed by a cap 
The largest part of non-end-use combustion (i.e., non-"tailpipe") emissions associated with 
conventional transportation fuels is covered in the industrial sector by a carbon cap's application to 
major stationary sources such as refineries and other facilities involved in producing and distributing 
gasoline, diesel, aviation and other transportation fuels. As long as the facilities are in the United 
States, they fall under the cap (unless their emissions fall below a regulatory threshold, such as 
25,000 tons of CO2). Thus, the increased GHG emissions that come from, say, domestic refining 
and upgrading of imported heavy crudes, or from domestic oil shale and coal-to-liquids processing, 
would not be missed by a cap.  
The emissions missed are those occurring overseas in countries without a carbon cap in place. 
Currently, the largest portion of such emissions is that associated with imported refined products, 
such as gasoline or gasoline components imported from refineries located in Venezuela, for 
example. Gasoline imported from refineries covered under the European Emissions Trading System 
(EU-ETS), on the other hand, is not a source of missed emissions in terms of cap-based accounting. 
Missed upstream emissions of growing concern are those associated with synthetic crude or finished 
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fuel products derived from Canadian oil sands. These emissions will remain inadequately accounted 
for unless Canada adopts a carbon cap that covers their production facilities.  
Lines I and J of Table 1 provide estimates for imported refined products and imported heavy crudes, 
respectively, of the relative GHG emissions that would be missed by a cap.35 As of 2005, the levels 
were 6 for refined product imports and 3 for heavy crude imports, relative to a reference emissions 
level of 100. EIA projects refined products to decline through 2030 due to expansions in U.S.-based 
capacity and a reduction of excess overseas refining capacity available for export to the United States 
as global demand for transportation fuels grows. On the other hand, the reliance on heavy crudes 
and unconventional resources is expected to grow. As a result, by 2030 the "high-carbon" fossil 
resource portion of missed emissions could grow to a level of 11 relative to the overall U.S. 
transportation sector base emissions level of 100 in 2005.  
Summarizing missed emissions  
Lines K (Low and High) of the table summarize an illustrative range for GHG emissions associated 
with U.S. transportation fuel demand that would be missed by a fossil-based cap-and-trade program 
as commonly proposed to date. These values are the sum of the estimates for imports of both 
conventional refined products and high-carbon crudes plus the estimates for biofuels.  
In 2020, the level of missed emissions ranges from 17 to 22 relative to an apparent (end-use, fossil-
carbon only) emissions level of 98 (Line D) implied by an unqualified interpretation of EIA's Annual 
Energy Outlook. By 2030, the range of missed emissions is 21 to 27 relative to a projected end-use, 
fossil-only level of 105. Of these missed emissions, the larger portions are still those related to fossil 
resources. The relative range of biofuel-related emissions missed by the cap in 2030 is 6–12, or 
29%–44% of the of 21–27 total relative emissions level.  
Translating these relative levels back to tons of CO2 (recalling the reference level of 1,985 TgCO2 
annual transportation sector emission in 2005) implies ranges of 342–430 TgCO2e in 2020 and 427–
546 TgCO2e in 2030. These values can be compared to the EIA projections of 1,955 TgCO2 in 2020 
and 2,088 TgCO2 in 2030, respectively. For 2020, an illustrative, proportional climate-protection 
target for the sector as shown in Figure 1 would require reductions of 500 TgCO2e relative to a 
trend reflecting neither vehicle efficiency improvements nor nominal biofuel reductions. Referring 
back to Table 1, missed emissions amount to 68%–86% of the reductions relative to the BAU (fixed 
efficiency) trend in Line B needed to meet the illustrative targets in Line A for 2020. Thus, the total 
GHG emissions associated with U.S. transportation fuel use but missed under a cap-and-trade policy 
as commonly proposed are large and significant relative to the targets and timetables being 
considered for national climate legislation.  
The legal and administrative status, in terms of either domestic or international policy, of the 
different components of missed emissions varies. Some can be considered forms of leakage; some 
would be captured in other capped domestic  or international sectors; some occurs in sectors such as 
agriculture that are not being considered for inclusion under a cap. Three general approaches come 
to mind for ensuring that missed emissions are addressed: (1) lifecycle-based regulation; (2) a 
comprehensive system of direct regulation (e.g., directly including all biofuel and biofeedstock 
production under the cap); and (3) a more careful specification of how to apply cap-and-trade to 
transportation fuels. In all cases, attention would be needed on how to handle cross-border 
components of emissions. This paper explores Option (3), which we call "Carbon Management for 
Transportation Fuels," integrated into a cap-and-trade program with mechanisms for addressing the 
gaps in traditional carbon cap accounting.  
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CARBON MANAGEMENT FOR TRANSPORTATION FUELS 
A GHG cap as commonly defined in terms of fossil carbon content would establish measurement-
based carbon (meaning GHG) management for the majority of emissions  now coming directly from 
the transportation sector itself. These emissions are largely the CO2 from tailpipes. Upstream 
emissions (e.g., at refineries) from domestic fuels production would be covered as stationary sources 
under the cap. Extending carbon management to uncovered (that is, uncapped) fuel-related GHG 
emissions entails focusing on both direct and indirect emissions throughout the supply chain and 
ensuring that, taken together, the prescribed policy mechanisms address all GHG impacts.  
Because agriculture is excluded from the cap and the agriculture sector is a net emitter of greenhouse 
gases (directly accounting for 8% of the U.S. GHG inventory), on a prima facia basis biofuels from 
average agricultural practice result in GHG emissions even if biogenic carbon and indirect effects are 
not counted. What is not known how the net GHG emissions from biofuels compare to those from 
fossil fuels. While fully resolving this question is a challenge, biofuels have already come into use for 
other reasons. Therefore, it is crucial for a fuels carbon management policy to account for biofuel 
GHG emissions while mitigating any associated leakage.  
Cap-based accounting 
An anchor for such a policy is a cap-based accounting protocol that credits only feedstocks, fuels 
and fuel components rated as having net uncapped GHG emissions lower than the direct CO2 
emissions of conventional fuel. This crediting would be done when determining the number of 
allowances that refiners submit for the fuel they distribute. Options include requiring refiners to 
submit allowances either for the molecular carbon content or, as a close approximation, the fossil-
fuel energy equivalent carbon content, of all fuel they distribute except to the extent that it is rated as 
having lower net GHG emissions from uncapped sources throughout its supply chain according to 
the Fuel and Feedstock Accounting Standard (FFAS) elaborated below. The approach outlined here 
uses the fossil-fuel energy equivalent convention; although molecular carbon content is scientifically 
more precise, the difference is small and can be considered a policy judgment call.  
If based on fossil fuel energy equivalence, this allowance submission requirement does not change 
the competitive position of biofuels already in the market, in terms of their pricing relative to fossil 
fuels they displace, from what it is today without a carbon cap in place. Currently, neither biofuel 
nor fossil fuel is exposed to a price signal from the cap. If allowances are submitted for only the 
conventional fuel carbon equivalent of biofuel, this aspect of market advantage or disadvantage 
remains unchanged, so that biofuel fuel producers are held harmless competitively relative the 
situation they face under current policy. Of course, a cap will differentially impact the production 
costs of all fuels, so market conditions do change overall.  
In this design, the FFAS rating is needed only to cover emissions not otherwise covered by the 
economy-wide cap. Thus, the object of the ratings is not comparison of fuels and feedstocks, but 
rather accounting for emissions in the context of a GHG management system integrated into the cap. 
The value of avoided emissions ("price of carbon") will then motivate reductions throughout the 
managed system. Thus, the FFAS is not a fuels performance standard (such as a LCFS) but rather an 
accounting standard that closes the gaps in GHG accounting that occur in cap-and-trade policy as 
typically proposed to date. In general, FFAS would follow a principle of accounting for all impacts 
"reasonably attributable" to producers of fuels and feedstocks, as well as other applicable GHG-
related accounting principles.36  
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Distinct roles for attributional vs. consequential methods 
In this regard, the FFAS approach is similar in scope to attributional LCA, which restricts system 
boundaries to "flows physically connected to the product under study" and is "static" in that 
"dynamic processes are not considered," with no attempt made "to account for price variations, 
changes in demand or technological improvements."37 Attributional LCA contrasts with consequential 
LCA, which models system dynamics and "is based on a system-wide approach where system 
boundaries are expanded [to] evaluate all of the changes in a system as a consequence of a 
decision."38 Consequential LCA is needed to incorporate ILUC into a policy that requires the use of 
a complete lifecycle analysis, as do the EISA RFS requirements and California's LCFS.  
Although consequential LCA is clearly valuable for scientific assessments and for informing policy 
development, it is less clear that it is appropriate for literal application in regulations or standards. 
Because it runs the risk of attempting to hold parties responsible for impacts well beyond those that 
reasonably can be attributed to their own actions, in the fuels GHG management approach outlined 
here consequential LCA is restricted to defining system-wide ILUC mitigation requirements and a 
strictly attributional method (the FFAS) is used for defining producer-specific requirements.  
Thus, the FFAS approach entails measurement-based GHG balances for each entity in the supply 
chain. Unlike the use of the renewability shortcut in LCA, biogenic carbon uptake and emissions are 
both explicitly carried on the balance sheets. A negative carbon value is tallied at feedstock 
production entities (farms and forests) where CO2 for plant growth is absorbed from the 
atmosphere. That value is then added to the positive GHG fluxes associated with the feedstock 
production to yield a net carbon balance value to which the produced biomass is rated. These fluxes 
would be based on verifiable data (such as known characteristics of reported inputs) or third-party 
verified, facility-specific practices (such as fertilization methods that lower N2O emissions).  
Most biomass presumably would be rated to a negative carbon value (credit) using this direct 
accounting, but the magnitude of the credit will be less than the quantity of absorbed CO2 unless 
perfectly zero-net-GHG growing practices are used. However, as noted in the earlier discussion of 
the renewability shortcut, leakage issues remain and must be addressed by other mechanisms, such 
as the Land Protection Fund (LPF) outlined here or alternative approaches that might be developed 
based on carbon offsets accounting.  
Carbon accounting at point of finished fuel distribution 
Regardless of the mechanisms used, a critical point of accounting is where finished liquid fuel 
products are distributed for sale. This is the lowest point in the supply chain where various fuel 
components are blended prior to distribution to retail outlets (often termed the point where fuel 
suppliers "break bulk"). Only at such a location in the system is it possible to fully account for the 
different GHG impacts of biofuels or bio-based fuel components being blended with fossil-based 
fuels and blend stocks for subsequent distribution to retail outlets.39  
EPA's expansive definitions of refinery and refiner in existing regulations seem well suited for 
specifying the point at which net GHG impacts of biofuels can be reconciled against the fossil 
carbon content of conventional fuels that they displace. Such a point of regulation is being 
considered for the lifecycle accounting under the RFS. The relevant definitions are:  
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 40 CFR 80.2 (Definitions.)40  
(h) Refinery means any facility, including but not limited to, a plant, tanker 
truck, or vessel where gasoline or diesel fuel is produced, including any 
facility at which blend stocks are combined to produce gasoline or diesel fuel, 
or at which blend stock is added to gasoline or diesel fuel.  
(i) Refiner means any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or 
supervises a refinery.  
Thus, if final blending occurs in a tanker truck being filled with various fuel components from a 
blending rack, EPA considers that to be an entity covered by the regulation, so that the finished fuel 
product delivered by the truck to a retail outlet has known and legally permitted characteristics. For 
purposes of this discussion, therefore, refinery refers to the point of finished fuel distribution at which 
net GHG impacts are reconciled for accounting purposes under the cap and refiner refers to parties 
obligated with allowance submission.  
This point of regulation is further downstream than the "refinery gate" that some proposals suggest 
for transportation under cap-and-trade. While the refinery gate can suffice for tracking the fossil 
carbon passing through the conventional refining system, is does not suffice for properly tracking 
the emissions from transportation fuel delivered to end-users because some product streams -- 
particularly those for many biofuels -- do not pass through a refinery gate.  
When biogenic carbon is left out of the cap, fewer allowances need to be submitted when biofuels 
substitute for fossil fuels. Refiners get the benefit of the doubt in that they have no responsibility to 
procure biofuels supplied through a chain having net uncapped GHG emissions that are verifiably 
lower than the direct CO2 emissions from fossil fuels they displace, but the climate bears the risk of 
unaccounted emissions. Otherwise put, this use of the renewability shortcut creates a problem of 
incomplete information -- indeed, what can be termed an adverse selection risk41 -- that inhibits the 
development of a transparent market for fuel sector GHG reduction tied to the cap.  
One key part of the solution to this problem is requiring allowance submission for the biogenic 
carbon or, in the approach is taken here, for the fossil fuel energy equivalent carbon in the biofuel. 
Specifically, refiners would be obligated to:  
 report the total energy value of all fuel they distribute, whether of fossil or biomass origin;  
 hold allowances sufficient to cover the equivalent conventional direct (molecular) fuel carbon 
content corresponding to the energy value of all fuel they distribute regardless of origin;   
 obtain credit (reduction in allowance requirements) only to the extent of fuel's rating to a level of 
net uncapped GHG emissions lower than the displaced direct carbon in conventional fuel.  
Thus, this approach treats ethanol as if it had the same end-use CO2 emissions as ordinary gasoline. 
Similarly, biodiesel is treated as having the same CO2 emissions as conventional diesel. Such ratings 
would also apply to biomass feedstocks, whether they are inputs for an identified biofuel or inputs 
that displace crude oil at higher points in the supply chain (as in the production of renewable diesel). 
Any of these biofuels or feedstocks can, however, carry carbon credits (based on the FFAS 
described below) that can serve to reduce the resulting GHG allowance requirements.  
Table 2 lists the direct CO2 emissions, based on molecular carbon content, for common liquid fuels. 
These values are strictly physical properties and are not based on lifecycle analysis. The value of 71.8 
gCO2/MJ shown here for gasoline is numerically less than the full-fuel cycle emissions ("carbon 
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intensity," or CI) factors proposed for a LCA-based fuels performance standard. For example, the 
95.9 gCO2/MJ CI value for reformulated gasoline blendstock used by CARB is 34% higher than the 
molecular carbon content, since it reflects all upstream emissions.42  
Note how, on a delivered energy (Btu or MJ) basis, direct CO2 emissions vary little for similar-use 
fuels. Putting biofuels in the cap would require allowance submission for the molecular carbon 
content of all finished fuel products regardless of origin (bio- or fossil). In this case, the other 
elements of this paper's overall approach (FFAS for tracking credits and LPF for addressing ILUC) 
would still work, with the refiners' obligation then based on biofuel's own direct molecular carbon 
content as shown in Table 2. The fossil-equivalent protocol outlined here is an approximation in 
that it uses the direct carbon content and energy value of reference conventional fuels.  
For example, one million gallons of Federal reformulated gasoline would have a delivered useful 
energy content (lower heating value) of 118 TJ and its consumption would directly release 8,498 
metric tons of CO2 (tCO2); this result is a straightforward multiplication of the values in the table, 
noting that one metric ton is equal to one million grams. Thus, 8,498 allowances would need to be 
submitted by the refiner who supplies that batch of fuel.  
Similarly, if one million gallons of E85 (blend of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline by volume) are 
distributed and none if the ethanol is rated under the FFAS, the math is as shown in Table 3. The 
resulting 6,167 metric tons of gasoline-equivalent CO2 emissions represent the number of 
allowances required for distribution of that quantity of fuel.  
Because in this example the ethanol is assumed to be unrated, the carbon content used is that of 
gasoline (71.8 gCO2/MJ), which serves as the reference fuel. While not quite as accurate as using the 
direct carbon content of ethanol, this default assumption entails only straightforward reporting of 
Table 2.  Direct CO2 emissions from end-use consumption of some 








Gasoline, conventional  121.9 71.81 
Gasoline, Federal reformulated  118.4 71.77 
Gasoline, California reformulated  119.2 71.78 
Ethanol (neat)  80.2 71.52 
Diesel, conventional  135.6 76.24 
Diesel, reformulated  135.0 76.54 
Diesel, Fisher-Tropsch  125.3 73.34 
Biodiesel (methyl ester)  123.5 77.47 
Source:  Derived from fuel properties tables in GREET 1.6; values are given on a Lower 
Heating Value (LHV) basis; MJ = 106 Joules = 0.9479 kBtu.  
Table 3.  Example allowance calculation for unrated E85 
 850,000  gallons of ethanol  80.2 MJ/gal  71.77 gCO2/MJ  =  4,892 tCO2 
 150,000  gallons of gasoline  118.4 MJ/gal  71.77 gCO2/MJ  =  1,275 tCO2 
 1,000,000  gallons of unrated E85 sums to:  6,167 tCO2 
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the energy value of all fuels and fuel blending components. The lower total of 6,167 tCO2 for the 
million gallons of E85 compared to 8,478 tCO2 for a million gallons of gasoline reflects the lower 
energy density of ethanol relative to gasoline.  
A FFAS-rated fuel would have a different (presumably much lower) carbon impact (net gCO2/MJ) 
than the default based on conventional fuel. The rating would contain the molecular carbon content 
of the fuel less any credits it carries based on verifiable carbon (GHG) balance data from its supply 
chain after debiting all uncapped emissions throughout the supply chain. Therefore, instead of using 
the renewability shortcut, a carbon update credit is carried forward through the FFAS ratings.  
Emissions accounting in the supply chain 
Conceptually, the FFAS approach involves examining the GHG fluxes across the system boundary 
of individual facilities in the supply chain, as illustrated in Figure 4.  "Facility" here refers to any 
entity involved in the production of biomass feedstocks or fuels, including farms or forests as well as 
biorefineries. The basis for the accounting is simply a carbon balance (tallying all GHG fluxes) for 
each facility, distinguishing capped from uncapped emissions as in the examples given below.  
For a fuel or feedstock to obtain a FFAS rating, every major entity in its supply chain would have to 
report uncapped emissions. A facility that is capped (e.g., as a stationary source) need not report the 
capped portion of its emissions for the purposes of rating its step in the supply chain. For example, 
emissions from generating the electricity purchased by a biorefinery need not be included as part of 
a fuel's rating value if it comes from a capped electric utility. However, other emissions at the 
biorefinery (e.g., CO2 from fermentation tanks) must be included.  




The most challenging aspect of a FFAS system is at the origin of the supply chain, namely feedstock 
production facilities such as farms and forests. However, empirical methods have been developed 
for assessing GHG balances in the field for purposes of validating agricultural offsets.43 Similar 
techniques could be applied at the level of a cooperative, district or perhaps county to provide data 
that are sufficiently specific for feedstock FFAS ratings that can be carried forward as input data for 
computing fuel FFAS values. 
Table 4 shows how such a tally might be 
done for feedstock production, in this case 
for a feedstock supply "facility" defined as 
the group of farms supplying corn to a 
particular ethanol plant. Based on a recent 
case study44 of a state-of-the-art biorefinery 
using local rain-fed corn as feedstock, these 
data may reflect better-than-average 
practice. Thus, the example is strictly 
illustrative, for the purpose of explaining 
how the FFAS approach works rather than 
for providing representative values. Also, 
this simplified discussion does not attempt 
to include all farm inputs and emissions 
sources, although many major items are 
listed (entries are shown for GHG 
emissions from fertilizer and other chemical 
inputs, but not for CO2 from application of 
lime, for example).  
The tally starts with the CO2 absorbed in the crop. This credit (given in thousands of metric tons 
[kilotonnes] of CO2) is readily calculated from the mass of biomass grown and standard values for 
carbon content.45 Conservation tillage practices that build soil carbon also enter as a credit (a 
negative emission value). Also excluded here is any adjustment for other impacts, including 
emissions leakages such as ILUC, that occur outside of the direct supply chain. Those impacts must 
be handled by other mechanisms such as the LPF described below.  
Emissions from purchased inputs, either fuels consumed on-site or from a power plant for 
electricity, are included in the table under the "all" emissions column, which is listed for reference. If 
these fuels come from facilities covered by the economy-wide cap, they do not carry over into the 
"uncapped" column of the tally. That is the case for the diesel fuel, propane and electricity in the 
example given here.  
GHG emissions from the production of chemical inputs are treated in a similar manner. Only those 
for nitrogen fertilizer production are shown in Table 4. This example assumes that most of the 
emissions from fossil fuel use (such as natural gas) associated with fertilizer production fall under the 
cap.46 If fertilizer is supplied from a facility whose GHG emissions are not covered by the cap, the 
associated emissions would need to be added to the uncapped emissions tally.  
Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are challenging to estimate and highly uncertain. However, site-
specific estimates can be made using a variety of techniques and can be based on data regarding the 
quantity and timing of fertilizer application.47 The case study referenced here used a N2O estimate 
Table 4.  Example GHG emissions balance 
for group of farms supplying corn  
 103 tonnes CO2-eq 
Item all uncapped
CO2 absorbed (737.0) (737.0) 
Conservation tillage (12.7) (12.7) 
Fertilizer production 22.6 3.8 
Diesel fuel 10.0 -- 
Propane 3.9 -- 
Electricity 4.0 -- 
N2O emissions 97.6 97.6  
Direct land-use 10.5 10.5  
Totals (601.1) (637.8) 
kg CO2-eq per bushel (29.4) (31.2) 
Source: derived from Mueller et al. (2008), using data for one 
year of operations supplying 20.45 million bushels of corn to 
the Illinois River Energy Center.  
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amounting to 97.6 kilotonnes CO2-equivalent.48 Finally, any direct land-use change, such as fields 
converted from a diverse growth reserve to crop production, must also be included, as illustrated by 
the last item before the total in the table.  
For this example, the FFAS rating for the feedstock (roughly 20 million bushels of corn) is a net 
uncapped emissions credit of 637.8 kilotonnes CO2-equivalent, or 31.2 kgCO2-equivalent per 
bushel. This value is less than the on-farm portion of GHG emissions that would be derived in a 
lifecycle analysis, which does not distinguish between capped and uncapped emissions. Also note 
that this rating is a physical value measuring the direct uncapped GHG emissions associated with 
providing the feedstock. No baseline is involved and so the rating does not represent an "emissions 
reduction" relative to some other feedstock (although some components, such as the soil carbon 
flux, may need to be measured against a baseline). The result is an absolute physical value (rather 
than relative reduction) that can be carried forward into a cap-based carbon accounting process. 
Therefore, an additionality question does not arise even though leakage remains a concern.  
Renewability shortcut not used 
A key point is that no automatic credit toward the carbon cap is given simply because a fuel's 
feedstock is "renewable." Credit for biogenic carbon is given only for a feedstock carrying a FFAS 
rating, with the CO2 absorbed from the atmosphere by plant growth being treated as an uncapped 
negative emission. (Refer back to the "CO2 absorbed in biomass" arrow in Figure 4.)  This value can 
be readily calculated from the carbon mass fraction of harvested biomass, which is the basis for the 
737.0 kilotonne CO2 value shown as the first item in Table 4. However, as just noted, this explicit 
accounting for CO2 absorption does not address leakage.  
Thus, under a FFAS approach, in order to obtain credit for such renewable carbon in their products, 
sellers of feedstock (e.g., corn, soybeans, cellulosic materials) would have to report emissions from 
all of the other uncapped inputs and processes at the farm where the feedstock was produced, as 
illustrated in the above example.  
Carrying ratings in commodity trading contracts 
As a bioenergy market reaches any reasonable scale, bio-feedstocks as well as biofuels and bio-based 
fuel components will be fungible, tradable commodities. Their FFAS ratings would need to be 
integrated into commercial transaction records and could be included in commodity trading 
contracts. An approach that exploits mechanisms of futures contract markets is likely to be more 
practical than a certification program separate from the established commodity trade.49 Such a 
contract would create an obligation to supply a commodity of a certain, known "quality" rating in 
this case, based on vendor-certified but third-party verifiable data supplied according to the FFAS. 
In addition to FFAS ratings, contracts could also carry a more conventional sustainability 
certification information based on criteria such as location of origin or other practices and 
characteristics of environmental and social concern.  
Practically speaking, feedstock FFAS rating might most commonly be done at a district or regional 
level rather than the individual farm level. Under a voluntary approach, no farmers would be 
required to produce a rating unless they wanted to sell products that had value toward meeting the 
carbon cap. It may take time to establish the necessary procedures and education will be needed to 
enable the agricultural and forestry communities to take advantage of the added value of FFAS-rated 
products in the carbon-constrained transportation fuels market. This situation suggests a potentially 
valuable role for agricultural extension services in developing and implementing the system.  
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Carbon credit for FFAS rated feedstocks 
could be applied anywhere in the fuel 
supply system. For example, forest residues 
carrying a FFAS rating could be supplied to 
a refinery equipped with a gasifier that 
generates syngas to displace natural gas or 
crude oil inputs, with the resulting carbon 
credit applied to refinery products for 
which allowances are being submitted. 
Similarly, a dedicated biomass crop (say, 
switchgrass) could be FFAS rated and used 
as input to an advanced biofuels process 
that yields alcohols or fungible blending 
components for "green gasoline" at a 
refinery, where the feedstock's FFAS credit 
could be applied. Further analysis is needed 
to specify a protocol for such feedstock crediting, which could be based on the number of 
allowances otherwise required to cover the molecular carbon in the fossil feedstock being displaced.  
Carbon balance at biofuel production facility 
For biorefineries or other processing facilities, carbon balance accounting is straightforward. It is 
based simply on characterizing GHG emissions across the boundaries of the facility and requires no 
information about the particular processes used in the facility. Process efficiencies will be reflected in 
less use of purchased fuels and avoided GHG emissions.  
Recall again that the purpose of the FFAS approach is not comparison of fuels for meeting a 
mandate or performance standard, but rather accurate GHG accounting for fuel-related transactions 
in a carbon market. The reward comes in the form of an avoided cost of allowance submission at 
the price of carbon in the capped fuels, which translates to greater value for biofuels and feedstocks 
having lower net uncapped emissions during their production.  
Table 5 illustrates such a calculation, using data for a biorefinery that processes the feedstock whose 
carbon credit was tallied in Table 4. The first line is the input feedstock credit to which the delivered 
corn is rated (in this case, a credit of 637.8 kilotonnes CO2-equivalent). The "all" column again lists 
all emissions for comparison. Only uncapped emissions need be carried over to determine the credit 
to which the resulting fuel is rated under the FFAS approach.  
Note the explicit tallying of CO2 emissions released from fermentation. Although their calculations 
are internally consistent, LCA approaches traditionally omit or obscure these emissions because they 
are biogenic, as illustrated earlier by the gap in the system boundary in Figure 2(b). Because the 
feedstock is carrying a credit for the absorbed carbon, the portion of that carbon that gets re-
released to the atmosphere during fermentation needs to be debited, as shown in the calculation 
given here.50 Some biorefiners have been exploring whether such by-product CO2 can be sold and 
sequestered, e.g., for enhanced oil recovery, in which case the magnitude of these emissions could 
decrease (or become zero if all the CO2 were sequestered) in the facility balance sheet, resulting in a 
credit larger than the net 397.3 kilotonnes CO2-equivalent shown in this example. The net credit in 
this case amounts to 88.8 gCO2e/MJ based on the lower heating value (LHV) of ethanol.  
Table 5.  Example GHG emissions balance 
for a corn ethanol biorefinery  
 103 tonnes CO2-eq 
Item all  uncapped
Corn Feedstock (637.8) (637.8) 
Electricity 24.9 -- 
Natural gas 90.2 -- 
CO2 from fermentation 240.5 240.5 
Totals (282.2) (397.3) 
gCO2e/MJ (LHV) (63.0) (88.8) 
Source: derived from Mueller et al. (2008), using data for one 
year of operations at the Illinois River Energy Center, which 




Another important matter is the need for well-defined protocols to allocate the GHG credits across 
co-products. Within the commodity-based agricultural production system, biofuels and their 
feedstocks are but one part of a fluid slate of products that any given producer will offer based on 
the market conditions at any given time. The fate of carbon uptake that is the basis of a FFAS credit 
will vary depending on those conditions. Some of it enters the carbon-capped transportation sector, 
potentially displacing allowance requirements; other portions enter the uncapped agricultural sector 
that supplies food, feed, fiber and forest products.  
The co-product allocation question has been a longstanding issue in traditional LCA methods, which 
commonly use economic factors to allocate estimated GHG emissions impacts across feedstocks, 
fuels and associated co-products. Moreover, when LCA methods are used, the co-product question 
necessarily applies not only to direct GHG impacts within the supply chain but also to indirect 
impacts such as ILUC.51 Because both direct and indirect impacts are market driven, substitution 
elasticities, trade variables and other economic considerations enter into LCA allocation calculations, 
introducing additional layers of complexity and uncertainty (and disputability) into the results.  
Under the annual basis carbon accounting using actual field- and facility-level data on which the 
FFAS approach is premised, co-product allocation can in principle be handled strictly on carbon-
mass basis. Such an approach enables unambiguous tracking of biogenic carbon according to 
whether it ends up in a biofuel product that displaces fossil carbon in a capped sector or ends up as 
a non-fuel feedstock or other product in an uncapped sector. Market effects may shift the bio-based 
product mix annually. But these effects will be captured in the reported facility-level data, avoiding 
the need for economic modeling because changes in a producer's product slate will be directly 
reflected in the quantities of carbon-bearing products leaving the producer's facility. The value of co-
products affects the economics of the operation and because the fuel-destined portion of facility 
output would be exposed to a carbon price signal through the FFAS, that value will be reflected in 
relative prices of fuel and non-fuel products. All that is needed to correctly track the carbon uptake 
credit is the mass of biogenic carbon contained in the fuel products. Such an approach would be 
unambiguous, involving straightforward calculations using measured facility data.  
Allowance crediting for FFAS rated fuel 
The rating derived above for ethanol using the FFAS can be applied in a net biofuel GHG uncapped 
emissions calculation and then substituted for the unrated values otherwise used to determine 
allowance requirements, as shown earlier in Table 3.  
Ethanol having an FFAS-based uncapped emissions credit of 88.8 gCO2e/MJ per Table 5 results in 
a net uncapped GHG emissions of 17.25 gCO2e/MJ after adding the direct CO2 emissions from 
combustion (71.52 gCO2/MJ as shown in Table 2). The calculation for 1 million gallons of E85 
blended using ethanol carrying such a FFAS credit is shown in Table 6. Instead of the 6,167 
allowances that need to be submitted for 1 million gallons of unrated E85, only 100 allowances 
would be required for a similar batch of fuel blended using ethanol having the FFAS rating derived 
for the example given here.  
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Note that the values developed here to illustrate the FFAS approach for crediting against allowance 
submission requirements under a cap are very different than those from a conventional lifecycle 
analysis. For example, the case study referenced for these illustrative calculations reports a GREET-
derived lifecycle global warming impact of 55.5 gCO2e/MJ for ethanol from the facility and farms 
examined.52 This LCA-based value includes both capped and uncapped emissions and also uses the 
"renewability shortcut," and so the calculation methodology is completely different than the FFAS 
approach. Therefore, such a LCA-based value cannot be simply compared to the 17.25 gCO2e/MJ 
credit derived here even though the underlying data are the same.  
The net 100 tCO2 allowance submission value may strike some as very low compared to the value of 
6,167 tCO2 for an equal volume of unrated E85, but several points should be kept in mind. One is 
that it covers only uncapped emissions; most of the fossil energy inputs to ethanol production are 
covered elsewhere under an economy-wide cap. The allowances needed to cover the associated 
emissions are required elsewhere and therefore reflected in the cost of fossil fuels and electricity 
faced by farmers and biorefiners. Another key point is that this value accounts only for direct 
supply-chain impacts; economically induced effects such as indirect land-use change are left to be 
handled through another mechanism. Finally, the value is very sensitive to the actual GHG 
efficiency of the supply chain. For example, if as suggested by some recent literature, the N2O 
emissions from corn fields are triple the default assumptions used in the referenced case study, that 
change alone would raise the allowance submission requirements to 3,073 tCO2 equivalent. That 
value is but half that of the 6,167 tCO2 needed for unrated E85 shown as in Table 3, but much more 
than the 100 tCO2 required if N2O emissions are as low as commonly assumed.  
A corollary to this discussion is that LCA results are inappropriate for determining or adjusting 
allowance requirements under a carbon cap. For example, it would be incorrect to determine credits 
by differencing full-fuel-cycle global warming impact estimates for gasoline and ethanol. The reasons 
include both the inconsistent system boundaries underlying the bio- vs. fossil-fuel lifecycle 
calculations (recall Figure 2); the failure to distinguish capped from uncapped emissions; and the fact 
that LCA fails to account for the different sectors (and perhaps different international jurisdictions) 
in which either the capped or uncapped emissions may occur. These basic inconsistencies rule out 
use of a LCA metric for addressing the emissions missed by carbon cap accounting even before 
considering the complications associated with economically induced effects.  
Land Protection Fund 
As for any expansion of global agricultural and forest products, increasing biofuel production 
compounds the pressure for land conversion, either directly or indirectly, to supply feedstocks.53 
Recent analyses have estimated large increases in deforestation due to the impact of biofuels demand 
on international commodity markets.54 Other analyses have disputed such findings, emphasizing the 
complexities and uncertainties surrounding induced land-use change.55  
ILUC can cause substantial leakage because the incremental increase in global demand for land 
increases the pressure to convert tropical forests, which have enormous stores of carbon.56 Leakage 
Table 6.  Example allowance calculation for FFAS rated E85 
 850,000  gallons of ethanol  80.2 MJ/gal  (17.25) gCO2/MJ  =  (1,175) tCO2 
 150,000  gallons of gasoline  118.4 MJ/gal  71.77 gCO2/MJ  =  1,275  tCO2 
 1,000,000  gallons of the FFAS rated E85 sums to:   100  tCO2 
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occurs if market dynamics shift GHG emissions to another place in a way that negates some or all of 
the emissions reductions otherwise attributed to a climate protection project, policy or program.57 It 
can be caused by a variety of phenomenon, particularly market-driven substitutions of production or 
factors of production (such as land), that result in GHG reductions in one region to be 
counterbalanced by emissions increases in another region. Another way to look at the situation is 
that the large release of CO2 from forest conversion results in a "carbon debt" that negates the CO2 
absorption benefit of growing biofuel feedstocks for many years.58  
It is commonly recognized that that agriculture is a net direct emitter of greenhouse gases and that 
growth in demand for agricultural and forestry products in general is among the forces driving 
tropical deforestation. This situation applies not only to corn grown for ethanol, but to seed oils and 
sugar cane as well as proposed dedicated biofuel crops such as switchgrass and any other purpose-
grown energy feedstocks. Crops that are highly efficient at both biomass production and building 
soil carbon may enable additional GHG reductions in spite of their incremental demand for land, 
and productivity gains may lessen the impacts over time. Such technical improvements do not 
eliminate the trade off even though they may reduce its magnitude. Only agricultural and forestry 
waste streams that would decompose without any other use (including otherwise building soil 
carbon) might be immune from having an induced effect based on demand for arable land.* 
Assessing the magnitude of land-use effects is itself an area of emerging science.  
Estimates of land-use change impacts 
Although ILUC impacts related to biofuels are significant, not only their magnitude but also how to 
estimate them are unsettled. Traditional fuel cycle models based on process energy representations 
omit such effects and have no mechanisms for handling them. Development of enhanced LCA 
techniques, combining traditional process analysis with input-output LCA in order to better evaluate 
economic interactions, is in progress.59 Such work may still yield an incomplete picture if ILUC 
impacts if it relies on a partial equilibrium framework. The primary approach used to date for 
estimating ILUC impacts is use of models that represent global commodity trades, such as those of 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) or Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI). CARB has used the GTAP model for its regulatory analysis.60 EPA is using a combination 
of models and has ongoing work underway to integrate the various techniques and develop better 
assessments of induced effects.  
One recent study estimated ILUC impacts equivalent to roughly an additional 100 gCO2e/MJ for 
U.S. corn ethanol.61 By comparison, typical lifecycle GHG emissions values based only on direct 
impacts are 74 gCO2e/MJ for corn ethanol and 92 gCO2e/MJ for conventional gasoline.62 A range 
of 100–200 gCO2e/MJ for ILUC impacts alone was identified by one group of analysts,63 while the 
applicability and validity of such estimates has been disputed by others.64 CARB's LCFS regulation 
uses a significantly lower ILUC estimate of 30 gCO2e/MJ for corn ethanol.65  
As part of its RFS rule development, EPA examined the ILUC issue in great depth and carried out 
an extensive review analysis using multiple models along with a peer-review process, as reported in 
its RFS2 NPRM and support documents.66 EPA determined lifecycle GHG impacts by developing 
                                                 
*As noted earlier, when products now considered "waste" come to have value in a carbon market, an incentive will 
arise to "produce" more of them. Policy design must be robust in the face of such market evolution regarding what 
is considered a valuable product; indeed, motivating such evolution to favor GHG reductions is a desirable 
outcome of market-based climate policy. Therefore, it may not be possible to "shortcut" carbon management by 
using policy specifications that pre-define any type of product or activity as "clean" in terms of GHG emissions; 
the importance of such caution is one of the main implications of this discussion paper.  
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scenarios over a range of time horizons with or without discounting. The NPRM listed illustrative 
results for a 100-year horizon with 2% discounting and a 30-year horizon with 0% discounting. For 
example, EPA's 30-yr, 0% value for gasoline amounts to 2,797 gCO2e/MJ, which is close to 30 
times the 92 gCO2e/MJ commonly cited for gasoline because it represents a cumulative impact over 
30 years. Scaling EPA's 30-yr, 0% ILUC value for corn ethanol by 30 years yields 60 gCO2e/MJ,67 
roughly in the middle of a 30–100 gCO2e/MJ range bounded at the low end by CARB's estimate.  
Numerous assumptions are behind the wide range of views on ILUC. Some assumptions pertain to 
how to handle time-varying GHG fluxes from land-use change, and therefore represent judgments 
as opposed to values that are verifiable empirically (through data gathering and rigorous scientific 
method). Some assumptions (e.g., regarding productivities and elasticities) are in principle verifiable, 
so that uncertainties could decrease as more data become available. However, measurement certainty 
to the degree generally expected of metrics directly applied for environmental regulation seems 
unlikely given the complexity of the interactions involved and the need to rely on highly aggregate 
data and unverified hypotheses regarding the behavior of interlinked markets.68  
Rough estimates of the magnitude of ILUC emissions impacts can be obtained by applying values 
given in terms of carbon intensity to biofuel volumes projected by EIA. The results are shown in 
Table 7. By 2020, for example, projected U.S. bio-based liquids consumption is 22 billion gallons, of 
which 88% is some form of ethanol. The resulting implied ILUC impacts are 57–190 TgCO2e/yr 
based on a carbon intensity range of 30–100 gCO2e/MJ. In calculating these purely illustrative 
ranges, no attempt was made to apply different values for biofuels that might be sourced from 
different feedstocks. For example, if breakthroughs enable a large fraction of ethanol to be made 
from waste materials, then impacts would be much lower assuming that the ILUC impact of waste-
based feedstocks is zero. Similarly, if a greater portion of the biofuel supply turns out to be bio-
gasoline or a bio-derived diesel fuel derived from wastes, or, say, algae grown on non-arable land, 
the impacts could also be much lower than the values in Table 7.  
Mitigating induced impacts 
Fundamentally, ILUC is an impact caused by demand growth encountering the finite resource of 
productive land globally available for crops, forests or other uses of biomass. It is a "macro" effect 
induced by the price signal from increased demand for agricultural and forestry products, whether 
caused by biofuels or other uses. If the biofuel-related portion of this price signal could be 
neutralized, or an equal-and-opposite price signal created and targeted for protecting vulnerable 
lands, then that would be a way to mitigate ILUC concerns.  
A growing body of scientific and international policy work to address tropical deforestation 
emphasizes the importance of providing affirmative financial incentives to protect forests.69 The 
basic principle is to compensate tropical forest nations (such as Brazil or Indonesia) for GHG 
reductions actually achieved based on measured reductions of deforestation, using remote sensing 
and other techniques to verify and monitor forest protection.70 The resulting demonstrated 
reductions below a pre-determined baseline would use internationally approved criteria to relate 
forest preservation to carbon stocks and result in carbon credit certificates (offsets) made available 
to the carbon market. These strategies, termed "Reduction of Deforestation and Degradation" 
(REDD), are gaining acceptance by the international climate policy community.71  
Such mechanisms could directly mitigate the added pressure on global land due to biofuels. 
However, the use of REDD mechanisms to address ILUC should not come at the expense of pre-
existing needs for slowing and stopping tropical deforestation. In other words, to the extent that 
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biofuel production compounds the deforestation problem, the total resources available for REDD 
would need to be expanded beyond those otherwise considered necessary. In addition to incentives 
for protecting tropical forests, mechanisms for protecting or restoring other lands that can hold 
carbon stocks might also be expanded for addressing ILUC. Any such offsets should meet high 
standards for quality and eligibility, following the customary requirements that the GHG reductions 
must be real, permanent, additional, verifiable, enforceable, account for any added leakage that might 
be induced, and have robust measuring and monitoring protocols in place.72  
Administration of a LPF would utilize data gathered for FFAS ratings supplemented by survey work 
to characterize the impacts of unrated feedstocks and fuels. The administering agency would 
quantify the ILUC impacts linked to total U.S. demand for biofuels and any other fuels that might 
induce land-use change. Such estimation can be done by applying the same global commodity and 
agricultural market models now being used to incorporate ILUC impacts into biofuels LCA. The 
values in Table 7 are illustrative of what the results of such estimations might be. Arguably, using 
such estimates to determine the number of offsets needed to mitigate the problem may be a more 
appropriate use of such highly aggregate, largely assumption-driven models than using them to 
define a product-specific metric for a LCA-based fuel regulation.  
Possible mitigation costs 
Given ILUC impact estimates, an administering agency would use the LPF to purchase the number 
of international forest offsets (REDD credits) needed to mitigate the leakage. The "mitigation cost" 
lines in Table 7 illustrate the ranges that might be involved using projected GHG  allowance prices 
from EPA (2009c) modeling of ACESA (2009). Such estimates depend on the many assumptions 
that influence modeling the impacts of climate policies, the RFS and ILUC. Allowance prices, which 
Table 7. Projected U.S. biofuel consumption and possible ranges of ILUC impacts and 
hypothetical carbon mitigation costs 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Total bio-based liquids,a 109 gal/yr 4.1 13.9 18.2 22.3 31.4 36.6
Ethanol fractiona 98% 93% 90% 88% 83% 81%
Average energy value,b MJ/gal (LHV)       81.2       83.4       84.5       85.6       88.0       88.7 
Biofuel energy consumption,c EJ/yr 0.33 1.16 1.53 1.90 2.76 3.25
ILUC impacts,d Tg CO2e/yr  Low 10 35 46 57 83 97
 High 33 116 153 190 276 325
Allowance price,e 2005$/tonCO2  10 10 13 16 21 27
Mitigation cost, 106 2005$  Low 100 350 600 910 1,740 2,630
    (rounded) High 330 1,160 2,000 3,050 5,810 8,760
Average cost per gallon, $ Low       0.02       0.03       0.03       0.04        0.06        0.07 
    (of bio-based liquids) High       0.08       0.08       0.11       0.14        0.18        0.24 
(a) Derived from Table 11 of EIA (2008a, for 2005) and EIA (2008b, for projection years).  
(b) Assumes non-ethanol portion has characteristics of biodiesel or Fischer-Tropsch liquids (which are similar).  
(c) In exajoules (1018J), lower heating value (LHV) basis, derived per (a) and (b).  
(d) Based on 30 gCO2e/MJ for the Low value and 100 gCO2e/MJ for the High value.  
(e) Assumes $10/t for 2005-10; 2015-30 estimates are from EPA (2009c) analysis of ACESA (H.R. 2454).  
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range $13–$27 per ton of CO2 over 2015–2030 for the EPA base ACESA scenario referenced here, 
determine the mitigation costs. (The prices in this example are notably lower than, say, the EPA 
(2008b) estimates for the Lieberman-Warner bill in the 110th Congress, mainly because of changed 
economic conditions and higher underlying energy prices.)  
Based on the assumptions behind the modeling cited, the mitigation cost for the 22 billion gallons of 
U.S. biofuel consumption projected in 2020 roughly amounts to $1–$3 billion dollars. A LPF at this 
level would purchase international forest carbon offsets equivalent to the 57–190 TgCO2e/yr 
needed to mitigate the estimated ILUC impact. More than ample international forest offsets are 
expected to be available at the allowance prices assumed here.73 The bottom lines of Table 7 show 
the implied costs per gallon of biomass-based liquid fuel demand, implying 4¢–14¢ per gallon in 
2020, for example. As for the questions of how a LPF would be funded and who pays for the 
mitigation, a number of options are possible as described in the discussion section, below.  
DISCUSSION 
The approach sketched here for addressing biofuels in the context of a fossil-based GHG emissions 
cap raises a variety of questions. While resolving all of them is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
worth offering at least a preliminary discussion while acknowledging that readers are likely to have 
other perspectives as well as other issues to raise. See also Appendix B for additional responses to 
some of the concerns raised during peer review.  
Key Issues 
This first subsection of discussion addresses key issues and other questions that come to mind 
regarding the approach. The question of how it differs from fuels regulation based on lifecycle 
analysis is addressed in the second subsection, starting on p. 31.  
Revisiting the "renewability shortcut" 
As noted in the Introduction, a common policy analysis convention is to not count the biogenic 
carbon in biofuels and other forms of bioenergy. This "renewability shortcut" is used in official 
GHG emissions inventories, economic models of climate policy and most LCA models used as a 
basis for regulation of fuel lifecycle emissions. While longstanding and seemingly logical, this 
accounting shortcut rests on an assumption that added demand on agriculture and forestry for 
bioenergy production has no net impact on the carbon balance of the biosphere, including carbon 
stocks in lands and forests. However, this assumption  should not be taken for granted; rather, 
climate policy should be designed to ensure that it limits emissions to targeted levels as verified by 
measured outcomes, rather than presumptions of what might happen ceteris paribus, or "other things 
equal," in terms of global land-based biological production.  
A problem with the renewability shortcut is the presumption that bioenergy bears no burden of 
proof regarding the full additionality of the CO2 reduction implied by the substitution of "young" 
for "old" carbon. Although assessments vary, the range of estimated land-use impacts is such that it 
can significantly reduce or negate benefits previously assumed for biofuels, whether derived from 
traditional crops or from energy crops that also compete for arable land. This concern is consistent 
with other scientific studies, not based on fuels LCA, indicating that one of the best possible uses of 
land from a global climate perspective is preserving and restoring forests.  
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This carbon accounting question is commonly recognized on the context of project-specific GHG 
management for the agriculture and forestry sectors. For example, according to the California 
Climate Action Registry's forest carbon protocol:  
… biological emissions are those resulting from … forest carbon pools [as identified 
in document] … and are considered emissions if an entity’s total carbon stocks 
decline from one year to the next.74  
It is conceptually straightforward to treat biogenic emissions correctly -- that is, as a measured net 
change in land-based biological carbon stocks -- in the context of a circumscribed entity, such as a 
farm or managed forest that might provide offsets. Techniques have been developed for measuring 
such changes in carbon stocks and accounting for leakage. The problem arises for fuel substitution 
that occurs outside of well-defined GHG management system, which is how biofuels have been 
treated in GHG emissions accounting protocols and public policy to date.75  
Some of the literature on the land-use change issue characterizes it in term of carbon "payback" 
periods.76 In LCA-based approaches, the time sequence of carbon releases (large release upon land 
clearing, slower releases from disturbed soils and a possible net loss of sequestration capacity) gets 
reflected in modeling assumptions that estimate time distributions of emissions and apply discount 
factors to represent the climate forcing effect of the CO2 releases over time.77 These considerations 
add another layer of complexity and disputability to a lifecycle-based metric.  
In contrast to LCA approaches that attempt to incorporate major spatio-temporal effects through 
modeling, cap-based accounting is strictly static based on annual (or other relatively short period) 
compliance accounting. If allowances or offsets are required to cover any estimated emissions 
release from land-use change at the time when it occurs, then mechanisms of capital markets can be 
used to address temporal effects, with the associated risks being priced into the trading. Such an 
approach has been described for carbon sinks.78 Similar mechanisms might also be used to address 
carbon sources due to land-use change.  
Regardless of the approach taken for fuels policy, GHG inventories should consider fully reporting 
the bioenergy CO2 emissions now omitted from their totals. Such reporting is optional under 
current IPCC guidelines. The U.S. EPA inventory, for example, tabulates biogenic emissions even 
though they are not included in the total estimate for national GHG emissions. In 2005, CO2 
emissions from "wood biomass and ethanol consumption" in the United States amounted to 207 Tg, 
compared to 5,751 Tg of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion.79 The "negative" emissions of growing 
biomass could then be given as a separate line item, perhaps included with the statistics now 
covering the CO2 sinks in land-use and forestry. Interpretation of such statistics would still need to 
consider how the overall carbon balance of the biosphere changes as result of the bioenergy 
production. Fully requiring such reporting would be non-trivial and entail modifying international 
GHG emissions reporting guidelines.  
In energy and emissions models, such an accounting adjustment would change the picture from 
what is now illustrated here in Figures 1 and 3 based on DOE's Annual Energy Outlook. As noted 
earlier, the apparent CO2 reductions suggested by traditional accounting is incorrect even under 
optimistic assumptions about the net reductions from biofuels. It would be more transparent to 
show direct transportation sector "emissions certain" in their entirety while crediting any net CO2 
reductions in the sector, such as agriculture, where it occurs based on verifiable, leakage-adjusted 
absorption of CO2 through plant growth.  
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Interaction of this approach with the RFS 
The approach outlined here can co-exist the RFS; it does not interfere with the basic fuel volume 
requirements although it does eliminate the need for the lifecycle GHG requirements for various 
categories of biofuels. Because the use of FFAS would be voluntary, no special provisions would be 
needed to "grandfather" fuels from producers who do not rate their products. For example, some of 
the ethanol from existing facilities that the RFS exempts from GHG reduction thresholds would 
likely remain unrated until the value of a FFAS rating makes it worthwhile for the producer.  
Nevertheless, while the RFS would still exist, a carbon cap backed by a FFAS system would avoid 
creating an incentive to produce unrated renewable fuels beyond RFS volumes because such fuels 
would have no competitive advantage in the carbon market. Because it requires verifiable 
measurement of net GHG emissions from the production of feedstocks and fuels, the FFAS in 
conjunction with the inclusion of fuels under the cap would create a market incentive for emissions 
reduction and innovation throughout the fuel supply chain.  
No GHG reduction credit would be given for products lacking a verifiable supply-chain FFAS 
rating. The incentive to use the FFAS is provided by the value that rated products have for reducing 
refiners' allowance requirements, a value that will propagate through the supply chain. A biorefiner 
could not rate its fuel unless it all of its feedstocks were rated. Under a voluntary approach, biofuels 
from existing facilities grandfathered under the RFS may have little incentive to rate their fuels and 
require rated feedstocks. However, given the market uncertainties faced by biofuel producers (as 
seen with the drop in gasoline prices and a dampening of fuel demand overall), the added value that 
can be attached to FFAS rated products is likely to be attractive.  
Thus, any growth beyond RFS volumes is market-driven based on a product's ability to show value 
(in the form of a FFAS rated GHG impact less than that of conventional fuel) for reducing the 
number of allowances needed under the carbon cap. Producers would have to weigh the value of 
producing FFAS-rated feedstocks and fuels against added costs of fossil inputs due to the cap-and-
trade system, but it could provide another way for producers in the agricultural sector to derived 
benefits from climate policy, analogous to their benefits from offset programs.80  
Financing a Land Protection Fund 
If a LPF is used to mitigate ILUC instead of treating ILUC impacts as an addition to uncapped 
emissions tally under the FFAS, it still leaves a question of who should pay for the mitigation. 
Several options come to mind, all of which have challenges. A sense of magnitude for the costs 
involved can be seen by referring back to Table 7.  
One option would be to allocate a portion of carbon market allowance revenues to a LPF. An issue 
here is that many demands exist for the use of allowance revenues. In particular, it would be 
counterproductive if a portion devoted to LPF mitigation detracted from the portion of allowance 
revenues that would have been made available for REDD on the basis of pre-existing needs apart 
from the added pressure on land conversion from biofuels.  
Alternatively but also within a carbon market context, funds could be raised from a surcharge on 
allowances purchased to cover the carbon in petroleum-based fuels. A rationale is that, because of 
oil's unique energy security risks compared to other fossil  fuels, oil-based CO2 emissions reductions 
should be more costly to trade away than, say, coal-based reductions.81 Although not targeted to 
biofuels-related impacts economically speaking, this approach can be seen as a way to amplify rather 
than undermine the incentive for non-petroleum fuels that is an established energy policy goal. A 
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surcharge could be based on estimates of the energy security externality associated with U.S. 
petroleum demand. A recent such estimate is $14 per barrel of oil,82 or about 29¢ per gallon of 
gasoline, which corresponds to $33/tonCO2 on the basis of petroleum carbon content. New analysis 
would be needed to estimate the volume of likely allowance trades on which such a fee would be 
assessed and how the resulting revenue would compare to the amount needed for a LPF.  
Outside of a carbon market context, an LPF could be financed through an energy security tax on 
petroleum fuels. The cost could then be spread over a broad and fairly well-known base, such as all 
U.S. oil use or oil imports. For example, spreading $14/bbl over the 9.8 million barrels per day of 
gross petroleum imports projected by EIA (2008a) would yield about $50 billion, much more than 
the $1-3 billion ILUC mitigation cost estimated under given assumptions as shown in Table 7. Thus, 
even a partial energy security externality tax would amply cover the costs of an LPF.  
Better targeted from an economic perspective would be an ILUC impact fee levied on biomass 
feedstocks and therefore passed on to biofuels produced from them. All of the questions about how 
to differentiate impacts according to the nature of feedstock and where and how it is grown would 
remain. Of course, this approach transfers the debate regarding use of an ILUC metric in lifecycle 
regulation to one regarding use of an ILUC metric to assess a fee on biomass feedstocks and their 
associated fuels. Whether or not the LPF is fee-based, policy makers will not sidestep the disputes 
that surround any proposal to apply a globally-derived metric to domestic feedstock and fuel 
producers who individually have no direct control over the ILUC emissions which would affect the 
value of their products. Obviously, all of the possible approaches on ILUC have pros and cons that 
will be viewed differently by different stakeholders in the debate.  
Would this approach be technology forcing?  
One of the rationales for a fuels performance standard such as a LCFS is the belief that the price 
signal from a carbon cap would be too weak, particularly in early years, to motivate the degree of 
long-term technology change ultimately needed in fuels. A question arises of whether the approach 
outlined here, lacking a LCFS even while providing rigorous carbon accounting coupled to the cap, 
is adequate for playing the "technology-forcing" role that some see as important.  
Alternative fuel proponents argue that a carbon cap is similar to a tax and that neither policy is 
sufficiently technology-forcing. A recent article promoting the LCFS states:  
Some day, when advanced biofuels and electric and hydrogen vehicles are commercially 
viable options, cap and trade and carbon taxes will become an effective policy with the 
transport sector. But until then, more direct forcing mechanisms, such as a LCFS for 
refiners, are needed to stimulate innovation and overcome the many barriers to change.83  
This reasoning seems to presume that a carbon cap would be effective only upon the commercial 
availability of certain technologies, rather than allowing that the carbon constraint might itself drive 
technology change. It also equates a cap and a tax. Although this paper cannot review the literature 
debating that issue, neither of these presumptions are universally shared. Indeed, the premise of a 
cap-based policy is that a binding constraint on emissions is essential for environmental integrity and 
that markets themselves -- as opposed to policies based on prospective assessments of what 
technologies might or might not work -- will drive innovations and find the most cost-effective ways 
to meet the environmental constraint.  
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A distinction needs to be made between the effect of a carbon cap and its associated price signal on 
energy demand and its effect on the GHG emissions of transportation fuel supply. The elasticity of GHG 
emissions is not identical to the elasticity of energy demand, although the latter is one component of 
the former. Empirically, transportation energy demand is fairly inelastic.84 Given the structural 
complexities of markets for vehicles and non-fuel aspects of the transportation system (e.g., land-use 
planning and infrastructure), such evidence supports the need for complementary policies such as 
regulations to address vehicle efficiency and public planning to address travel demand. But good 
evidence does not exist for the market response regarding the net GHG emissions associated with 
the transportation fuel supply system. The case for a technology-forcing fuel regulation, however, 
assumes that its response is zero, i.e., that the only response to a carbon constraint and associated 
price signal is the energy demand response.  
Thus, though it may be widely held in some policy circles, the need for "technology forcing" 
regulation in addition to a rigorously specified cap covering transportation fuels seems to be no 
more than a belief.  It is not supported by market-based policy principles.85 Neither is it supported 
by historical evidence; indeed, the experience with technology-based policies for transportation fuels 
is poor.86 While volumes of ethanol and other alternative fuels are being mandated, it is far from 
clear that the RFS is leading to a sustainable, market-transforming business. Many attempts to 
advance other alternative fuels over the years have failed.87 Brazil's experience with ethanol is often 
held up as a success, but whether it is transferable and how well it actually reduces net GHG 
emissions remain open questions.88  
In short, because no sufficiently similar policy has ever been tried, there really is no evidence one 
way or another regarding the effectiveness of a carbon cap on the net GHG emissions associated 
with supplying transportation fuels. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that a carbon cap covering 
transportation fuels would be ineffective; neither is there clear evidence that it would be effective. 
Nevertheless, the downstream fuel business in particular is competitive and very cost-sensitive, often 
operating with thin margins. It is plausible that a well-crafted policy, rigorously coupling the fuels 
market to allowance submission requirements with an appropriate point of regulation at the point of 
finished fuel product distribution, will provide an effective motivation for GHG emissions 
reductions never before needed in the fuels market.  
Examining the response of the transportation fuel supply system to being under an economy-wide 
carbon cap that constrains the market and thereby provides a value for GHG reduction in fuel 
production is a worthy topic for analysis. It is a question that has been neglected to date, perhaps 
because analysts mistakenly equate elasticity of fuel GHG emissions with elasticity of fuel demand, 
or because they assume that the dismal experience with technology-based alternative fuels policies 
implies that a market-based policy would also fail for the sector.  
Traceability of uncapped production-phase emissions  
The FFAS approach outlined here for tracking uncapped emissions during the production of bio-
based feedstocks and fuels requires a mechanism for tracing verifiable data through commercial 
transactions involving these products. This issue is common to any regulatory or certification system 
that attempts to address impacts associated with the production of a good that do not leave a 
physical or chemical imprint on the good itself, and which therefore must be traced by information 
tied to a product's records as it traverses the chain of custody.  
Ensuring the integrity of such information, particularly across international borders, can be a 
challenge. As experience with sustainable products certification has shown, careful oversight, inter-
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jurisdictional cooperation and integrity are crucial for avoiding risks of records falsification.89 This 
paper can do no more than acknowledge these challenges while noting that they exist regardless of 
the policy approach taken. Such challenges could well be worse under a system whose reliability 
cannot be ascertained without requiring such information for all fuels, such as an LCFS.   
Indeed, as proposed to date, lifecycle-based regulation sidesteps the issue by making extensive use of 
defaults and process pathway assumptions and the hope that "cleaner" producers will offer data in 
order to obtain a better LCA-based carbon intensity value. However, given the fact that such 
defaults may be based on negotiated modeling assumptions working from selective survey data, 
there are serious risks of adverse selection and it may be difficult to have confidence in the results. It 
is unclear that any fuel lifecycle models to date have been validated with independently verified, 
statistically representative data. Verifying the compliance of regulated entities through modeling 
rather than reporting of entity-specific data is an unusual approach to environmental management. 
Some might raise a concern that the reporting requirements for an approach such as that outlined 
here are too onerous to be practical. However, without verification, the benefits of a policy that is 
largely based on modeled rather than measured performance could prove to be illusory.  
The FFAS approach outlined here does not attempt to immediately assess the emissions impact of 
all biofuels, and is intended to be based on measurement and reporting of emissions and directly 
related physical flows rather than modeling. It takes a precautionary approach by assuming that 
biofuels have no reductions relative to conventional fuel except as documented. Because the use of 
the FFAS is voluntary, the system can be initiated at a small scale with a few producers able to 
pioneer the procedures, permitting oversight of early implementation of the accounting standards by 
agencies and third-party auditors whose methods can be developed, tested, refined and validated for 
broader use. In this way, the FFAS ratings -- and therefore the emissions tracked for reliable 
accounting in the cap-and-trade system -- will not get "ahead of the science" by relying on modeling 
that is highly uncertain and disputable.  
Methods for ensuring traceability of rating information can be developed and validated in parallel 
with the direct application of the FFAS for commercial feedstocks, fuels and fuel components. As 
noted earlier, the ratings could be incorporated into commodity trading instruments, adapting 
concepts that have been proposed for biofuels sustainability certification.90 The quantitative metric 
of net uncapped GHG emissions (often negative, i.e., a credit) associated with a feedstock or fuel 
could be combined with other sustainability information for ensuring that the products meet desired 
environmental standards overall. Although system with well-defined protocols for rating products in 
an objective manner tied to a national environmental protection policy should in principle conform 
to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules against trade discrimination, carefully examining trade-
related issues is a matter for future analysis.  
How this approach differs from regulation based on lifecycle analysis 
The approach outlined here shares with fuel lifecycle-based ("carbon intensity") regulation a 
common ideal of accounting for all GHG emissions associated with the production and use of 
transportation fuel. However, it differs from LCA-based regulation in significant ways:  
 It does not account for everything in one place; rather than a single LCA-based regulatory metric 
separate from the cap, it uses a three-part approach integrated into the cap.  
 It tracks only uncapped emissions, whereas LCA tracks all emissions regardless of whether they 
are capped or not.  
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 It tracks production-phase emissions directly measured at facilities (including farms and forests) 
rather than as emissions remotely associated with fuel product via assumed pathways.  
 Because FFAS treats production processes as a "black box," there is no need for the extensive 
process modeling which forms the basis of LCA ("full fuel cycle" analysis) as applied to date.  
 It entails a top-down, environmental-needs-based driver for technology change, rather than a 
bottom-up driver based on (and limited by) prospective technology assessment studies.  
 The approach aims for GHG management rather than product promotion.  
 It does not handle imports of high-carbon crudes or other unconventional fossil resources 
which would be captured in a LCA-based regulation.  
 It provides a greater degree of market-based flexibility and would most likely result in lower 
costs to both producers and consumers than a LCFS.  
Some of these differences pertain to methodology and assignment of responsibility. Also, as outlined 
here, this approach focuses on the particular challenges associated with biofuels and so does not 
attempt to cover all possible transportation fuels such as petroleum-based fuels from high-carbon 
fossil resources to electricity and hydrogen derived from a variety of sources. Nevertheless, concepts 
similar to those discussed here would be adaptable to biomass-based electricity and hydrogen, which 
now suffer from the same issues due to use of the renewability shortcut. Several of the distinctions 
between this approach and lifecycle-based regulation are elaborated as follows.  
Three-part mechanism 
One notable difference is that, rather than using a single mechanism (lifecycle regulation 
administered separately from the cap-and-trade system), this approach uses a three-part mechanism 
integrated into the cap. Instead of reducing the accounting to a single number, it effects complete 
accounting through the three components of: (1) rigorous specification of allowance submission 
requirements for transportation fuels in the cap; (2) accounting standards (FFAS) for uncapped 
GHG emissions in the direct fuel supply chain; and (3) a land protection fund LPF to address GHG 
emissions from indirect land-use change that occurs outside of the direct fuel supply chain.  
Focus on facilities rather than products, measured data rather than modeled processes 
The FFAS approach would entail procedures for measuring emissions at facilities that produce 
feedstocks and fuels rather than modeling processes associated with the production of different 
categories of feedstock or product. Thus, categories such as "cellulosic ethanol" or "corn ethanol" 
are not relevant to the methodology, which is oriented not to product discrimination, but rather to 
ensuring complete accounting at the point of allowance submission under the cap. Also unnecessary 
is the multiplicity of feedstock-fuel "pathways" that LCA modelers create in an attempt to achieve 
better discrimination in the face of ever-evolving options and practices.  
Although LCA methods ideally could be based on actual data, this ideal is not how LCA-based 
regulations are being promulgated in practice. Both CARB and EPA rely heavily on a "check box" 
approach defined using lists of feedstock-fuel pathways. While the rules allow producers to 
substitute actual data, the defaults are all based on modeling, resulting in a system with significant 
risks of adverse selection. That is to say, a pathways-based regulatory approach sets up a situation of 
asymmetric information because parties can comply without providing verifiable, facility-specific 
data, running the risk that actual GHG emissions are higher than those modeled for the pathway 
under which an obligated party complies.  
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The liabilities of such an approach are implicitly acknowledged in EPA's recent RFS NPRM, which 
notes that, as for the original RFS based on EPACT (2005), the proposed regulation "does not 
distinguish biofuel on the basis of where within the country the biofuel feedstock was grown…," 
even while noting the significant regional differences that exit.91 Among EPA's rationales is the fact 
that feedstocks are widely traded commodities; in contrast, the approach outlined here suggests 
tackling this issue head-on, for example, by attaching FFAS ratings to commodity trading contracts. 
The transportation fuels market is a commodity market and so, to be effective, climate policy must 
create affirmative incentives and verifiable mechanisms for tracing GHG emissions impacts through 
market transactions, rather than sidestep the issue through extensive use of defaulting.  
Compared to LCA-based regulation such as an LCFS and parts of the RFS, the approach outlined 
here is more like traditional facilities regulation in that its focus is the set of entities along the supply 
chain. However, instead of regulating facilities for their emissions (beyond the extent to which they 
may already be regulated as covered entities in the cap-and-trade system), it requires verifiable 
reporting of uncapped emissions (GHG fluxes both positive and negative across a facility boundary) 
if a facility wishes its products to carry a FFAS rating that enables GHG allowance crediting. While 
not claiming to regulate all fuel-related GHG emissions, the voluntary FFAS approach attempts to 
balance the need for environmental integrity in sectors that policymakers decide to regulate against 
the need to respect policy decisions that leave certain sectors and sources unregulated. And as noted 
above, the traceability challenges of a FFAS system are likely to be less risky and more containable 
that those of a LCFS.  
The benefits of a given practice or process at the facility where it is used will be reflected in the 
measurement-based accounting that is tied to actual, commercially traded products produced 
(feedstock, fuels or fuel components) and rated according to the FFAS protocol. Efficiently 
produced corn, for example, using rain-fed agriculture with minimal inputs involving uncapped 
emissions and precise fertilization to minimize N2O emissions, will automatically reflect a large 
FFAS-based credit when its actual uncapped emissions are tallied, resulting in a larger credit 
available to a biorefiner that processes it and subsequently resulting in a need for fewer allowances 
to be submitted by refiners blending the resulting corn ethanol into their fuels.  
Therefore, a key corollary to the approach outlined here is this:  
A market-based policy that establishes sound GHG management throughout 
the supply chain need not entail explicit comparisons of fuels.  
In other words, the focus on facilities where emissions occur rather than their products, and the 
emphasis on actual production data rather than assumed processes, means that policy makers need 
not put themselves in the position of judging certain fuels as "clean" or "dirty" relative to others.92 
Moreover, this approach will quickly reflect changes that affect actual emissions, whether they are 
running incremental improvements in operations that reduce emissions or weather-related variables 
that might increase purchased inputs. The FFAS system thereby ensures accurate accounting while 
avoiding (or at least minimizing) the adverse selection risk of an approach based mainly on process 
characterization and heavy reliance on default assumptions.   
With FFAS ratings incorporated into market transactions for the bio-based feedstocks and fuels, 
their value for GHG mitigation will be reflected in their price. This will enable the carbon market to 
drive reductions, rather than needing a potentially cumbersome (and possibly contentious) regulatory 
deliberations that involve explicit comparison of products. This paradigm is consistent with the fact 
that it is the "stationary source" emissions associated with production that should be the object of 
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attention, rather than the products themselves, which are otherwise fungible (i.e., corn ethanol is the 
same chemical as cellulosic ethanol) regardless of how they were produced.  
Toward GHG management for fuels 
The facilities and measurement focus of the approach sketch here can also be viewed as striving for 
emissions management rather than emissions reduction. Reductions will then follow from the carbon 
constraint and resulting price signals on the managed system. The distinction between management 
and reduction is not just semantic, but has implications for policy design. Nevertheless, both are 
means to the end, which is neither management nor reduction per se, but rather the verifiable 
limitation of economy-wide emissions to climate protective levels defined by the cap.  
Traditional energy policy approaches are reduction oriented. They are commonly designed on the 
basis of options (technologies and practices) considered to cut emissions below levels projected in 
the absence of new policy. For transportation fuels, this paradigm has inspired policies that promote 
(e.g., through mandates and incentives) options that are believed to reduce emissions. Such is the 
case for both the RFS and LCFS as envisioned to date. Of course, a LCFS could evolve toward a 
true management system by means of provisions that enable fuel suppliers to substitute actual 
production data for modeling that otherwise projects lifecycle GHG intensities for categories of 
feedstocks, processes and fuels ("pathways").  
The approach outlined in this paper emphasizes the dictum, "what gets measured, gets managed." 
The policy mechanism (the FFAS) is defined around verifiable emissions data for individual 
producers of feedstocks and fuels. When direct measurement is not feasible, the system can use 
impact-specific models with local inputs, e.g., for estimating N2O emissions and soil carbon fluxes, 
as opposed to overall systems modeling based on generic data for broad feedstock categories. For 
induced effects that occur outside a commercially traceable supply chain, a management-based 
approach would strive to handle them directly in situ, e.g., through REDD incentives for forest 
carbon management to mitigate indirect land-use change. Again, the focus is on the "producer," in 
this case of forest carbon stocks, which are likely to be best managed at the national level.  
Another way to look at the distinction in approaches is that a management-based paradigm seeks to 
establish a transparent, well-functioning market by eliminating the information barrier due to lack of 
knowledge about emissions in the fuel supply chain. It relies on the economy-wide cap and resulting 
market signals (reflected in differential prices for FFAS rated products) to motivate emissions 
reducing options throughout the supply chain, be they feedstocks, products or practices, and do so 
without having the policy pre-identify them as such. By emphasizing transparency, a GHG 
management system will foster emissions reductions of any verifiable form. Some of these 
reductions are likely to be found what are considered "high- carbon fuels," whether of bio- or fossil-
origin, because that may well be where the most cost-effective GHG mitigation opportunities lie.  
Addressing high-carbon conventional fuels, other "imported" emissions 
One concern that the FFAS approach does not address but which a LCFS claims to address is the 
upstream (production) emissions from high-carbon fossil fuels. These are conventional products 
such as gasoline and diesel derived at least in part from inputs that entail higher production-phase 
GHG emissions than conventional petroleum inputs such as light crude oil. Such high-carbon 
feedstocks include coal (for coal-to-liquids processes), heavy crudes, bitumen (such as tar sands) and 
other unconventional resources (such as shale oils).  
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If these resources are extracted and processed in the United States, then they would fall under the 
cap and their additional production emissions are covered. However, if they are imported, as either 
synthetic crude or refined product, then their additional upstream emissions are not covered. As 
shown in Table 1, imported high-carbon fuel sources that would be missed by a U.S. carbon cap 
involved upstream emissions amounting to an additional 3% over U.S. transportation sector direct 
CO2 emissions as of 2005 and that impact is projected to grow to 11% by 2030.  
The emissions associated with imported fossil-derived fuels are in principle no different than those 
for other imported products. It is fair to ask whether they should be treated differently than 
embodied GHG emissions of other products (such as steel, timber, durable goods) produced 
overseas in uncapped nations. They therefore might be handled best by mechanisms designed to 
address trade-related impacts, such as border adjustments or other policies having an ultimate goal 
of encouraging countries with which we trade to also adopt carbon caps. In any case, lack of 
coverage for such emissions is a limitation of the voluntary FFAS approach outlined here that merits 
additional analysis. It could conceivably be handled by a system requiring mandatory reporting of 
uncapped GHG emissions associated with all fuels, but such an approach could face a question of 
why it would not be required for all products, not just fuels. Recall that the rationale for a special 
approach such as FFAS for biofuels is the substitution of uncapped biogenic carbon for capped 
fossil carbon, a problem that does not arise in the case of embodied emissions generally.  
Likely lower costs to consumers and producers than a LCFS 
A cap-and-trade approach is considered to be a least-cost way to achieve a given level of emissions 
reductions. For transportation fuels the evidence to support such a claim is limited, although cap-
based approaches with credit trading have been successfully used to administer both the elimination 
of lead and the reduction of sulfur in fuels.93  
Analysis of California's proposed LCFS projects that it would be economically beneficial to the 
state.94 Other economic analysis indicates that a LCFS is not a cost-effective way to reduce fuel 
GHG emissions.95 In any case, views regarding LCFS cost-effectiveness depend on assumptions 
regarding the future costs of technology options that have not yet been proven commercially viable, 
such as the production of cellulosic ethanol. However, if such options do become available at costs 
as low as proponents project, those economic benefits would also be captured by a cap-and-trade 
policy. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a policy anchored in cap-and-trade would be no more 
costly than a LCFS, and likely to be less costly if assumptions regarding the cost-effectiveness of 
technologies assumed for a LCFS are not born out.  
CONCLUSION 
Placing a cap -- a declining, legally binding limit -- on GHG emissions at the national level is an 
essential cornerstone of climate mitigation policy. Combined with emissions trading, the resulting 
program offers an economically efficient carbon management framework for reducing emissions 
across sectors and by a variety of means including technological innovation and behavioral change.  
However, the determinants of GHG emissions are complex. A simple carbon market alone does not 
to suffice to address structural factors, long-lived investments in energy supply systems and 
infrastructure, the role of other national priorities and other policy considerations that shape or 
constrain the many factors that determine GHG emissions. Moreover, the distinctive characteristics 
of existing, intertwined energy and related product and service markets affect the response to a cap-
and-trade system and the price signal it generates. For these reasons, comprehensive climate policy 
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proposals include additional measures that complement and enhance the cap-and-trade system, 
ideally leading to a program that is cost-effective, equitable and respectful of other national goals as 
well as environmentally sound.  
Climate policy builds upon pre-existing energy and environmental policy. In the United States, this 
foundation includes the Clean Air Act (CAA) and successive national energy policy acts as well as 
their policy counterparts at regional, state and local levels. The sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program 
included in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments is a model for the application of that mechanism to 
the climate problem. More fundamentally, the core CAA principle of health-based air quality 
attainment -- a scientifically determined environmental goal to be met regardless of cost -- provides a 
model for the cap itself,  even though the specification of GHG emissions targets and timetables 
necessarily entails international considerations. Most importantly, the CAA offers a clear legacy of 
success, in both achieving substantial and ongoing progress toward its stated goal of healthy air and 
doing so cost-effectively.  
The energy policy legacy is not so positive, particularly when it comes to transportation energy use. 
More than three decades of alternative fuels policies have yet to lead to anything that can be termed 
meaningful progress (i.e., beyond limited niches). The RFS and LCFS approaches, even with their 
LCA-based GHG requirements, are outgrowths of energy policy. Even though an LCFS might be 
rationalized with legal reference to the CAA, structurally it has more in common with the 
prospective, promotional approaches of traditional alternative fuels policy. Neither the RFS or LCFS 
ensure with any reasonable confidence that emissions are limited to levels consistent with an 
economy-wide cap. Therefore, they cannot substitute for covering fuels under the cap with verifiable 
protocols for measuring and controlling or mitigating the GHG emissions associated with all fuels. 
In general, whether complementary measures are based on pre-existing policy or are created anew 
for climate policy, the better integrated they are into the cap, the more likely the overall policy is to 
achieve the ideals of environmental and economic effectiveness.  
Because the majority (about 80%) of GHG emissions are from fossil fuel use, and because fossil fuel 
use can be measured with good accuracy, climate mitigation proposals specify the cap in terms of 
fossil carbon. Including transportation fuels in such a cap puts the majority of the sector's emissions 
under carbon management. GHG emissions at domestic refineries and other sources in the fuel 
supply system are covered under such a cap, as are any fossil fuel inputs to the domestic production 
of alternative fuels including biofuels, electricity or hydrogen.  
Biofuels present an special problem because biogenic carbon is excluded from a fossil-based cap. 
Although this "renewability shortcut" is commonly used in official GHG inventories and in energy 
and climate models, it causes a gap in carbon accounting. The extent of the accounting error 
depends on the magnitude of uncapped emissions associated with biofuels plus the extent of 
leakage, particularly the indirect land-use change due to demand for biofuel feedstocks (and for 
bioenergy in general).  
The question of how to treat biofuels in the context of a fossil-based carbon cap can be considered a 
problem of incomplete information. The carbon market is unable to address significant portions of 
biofuel-related emissions due to lack of specific data on GHG emissions from feedstock and fuel 
production facilities throughout the supply chain. The three-part approach outlined here can be seen 
as a way to address this information gap through careful accounting at the point of allowance 
submission and mechanisms to track uncapped emissions and mitigate leakage. It thereby exposes 
biofuel-related processes and facilities to a carbon price incentive tied to the economy-wide cap, 
creating a more complete carbon management framework for the transportation fuels sector.  
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Although the agricultural sector is not proposed for coverage under a cap, if some of its products -- 
such as biofuels or bioenergy generally -- substitute for capped fossil fuel, then their associated 
emissions must be accounted for if the integrity of the cap is to be maintained. The approach 
outlined here does so through a voluntary crediting mechanism, in that reporting of biofuel related 
emissions is needed only if the biofuel is used to claim a reduction in allowance requirements relative 
to the fossil fuel equivalent CO2 otherwise emitted in the transportation sector. Thus, this approach 
does not extend the cap to the agriculture sector, but rather ensures that all emissions that occur in 
the capped transportation sector are adequately covered. Uncapped sources in the agriculture and 
forestry sectors remain uncapped in that their emissions are not regulated and only need to be 
reported if producers wish to claim credits for reducing refiners' allowance requirements in the 
capped transportation sector. A mitigation fund is used to address the remaining problem of ILUC.  
Through coupling mechanisms such as those outlined here, the cap itself will become an effective 
driver of beneficial change in fuels. This approach contrasts with proposals based on pre-existing 
policy paradigms, which attempt to work around the shortcomings of the cap by using 
complementary measures that operate separately from cap-based GHG accounting. The extent to 
which the new options presented here might be useful for policy development is a question for 




U.S. Transportation Sector GHG Emissions:  
Current Inventory, Projections and Market Structure 
 
This appendix reviews transportation GHG emissions as reported in the EPA inventory and 
projected in the DOE Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), which form the basis of the sketch model 
described in the text. Also briefly described is the sector's market structure, which involves 
interactions among the multiple actors who provide and use transportation services. These actors 
include fuel providers, automakers and other equipment suppliers, public and private entities that 
plan, finance and operate transportation infrastructure, as well as consumers and other system users.  
Current inventory 
Figure A-1 (at end of this appendix) shows a breakdown of the 2005 U.S. GHG inventory. 
Transportation accounted for 28% of U.S. GHG emissions in 2005, the base year for the analyses 
given here. Although EPA has since published updated inventories with statistics through 2007, 
energy use and therefore GHG emissions have not grown much due to economic conditions and 
rising energy prices, and sector shares differ little from those shown in Figure A-1. Of the 2,009 
TgCO2e emitted from the sector in 2005, 94% was CO2 from fuel combustion.  
Within transportation, automobiles (cars and light trucks) comprise the largest part of the inventory, 
accounting for 60% of GHG emissions. Medium and heavy-duty vehicles (largely freight trucks) 
accounted for 20%. Third largest was 9% for aircraft (largely commercial jets). Modal shares of 
GHG emissions parallel shares of sector energy use, which amounted to 27.5 Quads (1015Btu), or 13 
million barrels per day oil-equivalent in 2005.96 End-use fuel consumption included 137 billion 
gallons of gasoline, 44 billion gallons of diesel fuel and 18 billion gallons of jet fuel in 2005. Ethanol 
consumption totaled 2.8 billion gallons (1.8 billion gallons gasoline energy-equivalent) in 2005, 99% 
of which was used in low blends (gasohol). Through 2007, fuel use in the U.S. transportation sector 
remained 95% petroleum based.  
Each of the transportation modes has its own market structure, with emissions determined by the 
collective decisions of the various actors involved. For that reason, it is not possible to break 
emissions down further, for example, by allocating portions of automobile emissions separately 
among automakers, fuel suppliers and consumers. The interdependent relationship among the 
factors that determine emissions for each mode is illustrated by the triangle feeding into the car and 
light truck portion of the inventory. Similar multi-actor situations characterize the energy and GHG-
related markets for other transportation modes.  
Projected emissions 
Table A-1 (also at the end of this appendix) summarizes relevant projections from recent editions of 
the AEO along with projections derived from it for the purpose of constructing the sketch model 
described in the text and from which the scaled (2005=100) levels given in Table 1 were derived. 
Although the AEO was again recently updated to reflect the 2009 economic stimulus package and 
revised economic and energy price assumptions, such changes are not consequential for purposes of 
the sketch model presented in this paper. The analysis was underway prior to that update and so 
retains use of the AEO 2009 early release projections issued in December 2008 (EIA 2008b).  
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As shown in the first line of Table A-1, EIA projected only slow growth in U.S. transportation 
sector CO2 emissions through 2030. The 5% increase from 1,985 Tg of CO2 in 2005 to 2,088 Tg in 
2030 averages out to a compound growth rate of only 0.2% per year. This reduction in growth 
represents a marked contrast from previous projections as recent as those of the 2006 Annual Energy 
Outlook (EIA 2006), which projected transportation sector CO2 of 2,667 Tg in 2030 and a average 
2004-2030 growth rate of 1.3% per year. That made transportation the fastest growing sector in 
terms of CO2 emissions, as it had been for a number of years. Recent historical growth in 
transportation CO2 emissions was 30% over 1990–2005, for an average rate of 1.8% per year.97  
Of course, one key reason for the lower growth projection is much higher oil prices. AEO 2006 
projected an average 2010–2030 price for imported crude oil of roughly $46/bbl, while the AEO 
2009 early release projects an average of $108/bbl for that period. The passage of stronger CAFE 
standards further dampens projected demand by constraining vehicle efficiency to levels higher than 
would have been projected based on even the higher fuel prices alone. And of course, the economic 
downturn has resulted in lower near-term economic activity levels than had been previously 
projected, taking a bite out of cumulative growth that is not recovered over the projection period. 
The fourth section of Table A-1 gives a "Higher vehicle efficiency only scenario" that reflects all of 
these changes and indicates transportation sector direct CO2 emissions growing to 2,266 Tg by 2030, 
or 14% above the 2005 level implying 2005–2030 average growth of 0.5% per year.  
What explains the remaining apparent reduction in transportation sector CO2 emissions is DOE's 
use of the renewability shortcut, i.e., failure to account for all of the emissions impacts of biofuels 
that enter the fuel pool as driven by the RFS. As shown in the third and fourth lines of the first 
section of Table A-1, the AEO 2009 projections suggest a drop in average carbon intensity to a level 
roughly 8% lower by 2030 compared to the 2005 base year level of 67.4 gCO2/MJ. This value 
represents only direct (end-use combustion) emissions and does not count biogenic carbon. Fossil-
based emissions associated with the biofuels production chain do show up elsewhere in the AEO's 
industrial sector tallies. But non-fossil emissions, whether from N2O or CO2 from land-use change 
(or any lack of additionality in the bio- for fossil-carbon substitution) are not reflected.  
Other elements of the sketch model projections are also given in Table A-1 as explained in the table 
notes and are not elaborated further here. A copy of the Excel workbook containing these tables and 
related calculations is available from the author by request.  
Transportation sector market structure 
Under a cap-and-trade policy, national GHG emissions would be placed on a declining trend with a 
legally binding constraint (the cap) falling collectively (rather than individually) on the covered 
sectors. For what is generally considered to be a comprehensive ("economy-wide" or "multi-sector") 
program, all sectors except agriculture are integrated under the cap. Although every end-use sector 
has its integration issues, the problem is particularly challenging for transportation.  
This issue is illustrated by the auto sector breakout shown in Figure A-1. Cars and light trucks (the 
automobile subsector) account for 60% of the transportation total, and therefore about 17% of total 
(non-net) U.S. GHG emissions. The triangular representation of automobile emissions illustrates the 
fact that multiple actors are responsible for automobile emissions. The "three-legged stool" nature of 
transportation emissions -- that they are a product rather than a sum of factors influenced by different 
actors -- means that the sector cannot be cleanly subdivided for purposes of allocating either 
responsibility for reductions or allowances under a cap-and-trade program. A similar market 
structure exists for other transportation subsectors.  
 
40 
As shown in the figure, one way to depict this "factorization dilemma" is as a triangle with 
consumers (car drivers) in the middle. Most emissions (the downstream portion related to fuel use) 
occur at the vehicle due to consumers' fuel use. The points of the triangle correspond to the other 
major actors who significantly influence the factors behind auto emissions. All of these actors have 
financial relationships with consumers and other end-users of the transportation system:  
 Consumers purchase fuel from fuel suppliers, now mainly the petroleum industry;  
 Consumers purchase vehicles from automakers; and  
 Consumers purchase (through taxes, other user fees and the price of many bundled services of 
the built environment) roads, parking, land and its associated uses and land-use patterns from 
the array of public and private actors involved in providing the infrastructures plus urban and 
regional plans that underpin travel demand.  
This situation is why, even though all cap-and-trade proposals to date make fuel suppliers the point 
of regulation (POR), a more accurate way of characterizing such a POR is to say that fuel suppliers 
perform an accounting function on behalf of all actors in the sector (consumers, automakers, system 
planners and fuel suppliers), whose decisions collectively determine GHG emissions from 
transportation.  
Thus, no simple price-quantity model fully captures the details of the real-world market decision 
making that influences transportation GHG emissions. Neither can a simple, single-market model 
adequately inform policy design for integrating the transportation sector into a carbon market under 
a cap-and-trade program. The distinct markets that determine transportation emissions can be seen 
as transactions (cash flows) from consumers (or other system users who are the source of demand) 
to the actors (suppliers of transportation-related services) at the tips of the triangle. This complex set 
of very different but interlocking markets is what defines the "real" market in which decisions 
shaping transportation sector carbon emissions are made. It is not simply reducible to the market for 
motor fuel, although that is one of the key markets and also a primary collection point for the user 
fees that support much (but not all) of the road system.  
A market-based policy must reckon with all of these relationships. Focusing on just one (such as the 
fuel market price-quantity response) will lead to an incomplete and ineffective policy. Because the 
vehicle, fuels and system planning markets are so different, neither can one expect to easily levelize 
costs of carbon reduction among them or among these auto-related markets and the interlocking 
markets for other transportation and non-transportation sources. That is not to say that mechanisms 
for exploiting economic efficiencies cannot be developed.  But it does call into question the idealistic 
notion that such diverse markets can be efficiently handled with a singular mechanism such as 
simple inclusion of fuels in the cap, even though such inclusion is likely to be essential for 
integrating the sector into an economy-wide cap-and-trade framework.  
Ultimately, rationally managing fuel-related emissions under a cap entails a bookkeeping problem 
that is complex but which must be addressed to ensure environmental integrity, equity and economic 
efficiency for the transportation elements of climate policy. The special issues associated with 
biofuels that this paper explores are one aspect of the larger problem of mechanism design for 
transportation-climate policy.  
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Table A-1. Projected U.S. Transportation Sector Energy Use and CO2 Emissions 
(TgCO2e/yr unless otherwise noted) 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
CO2 emissions, sector totala 1,985 1,904 1,932 1,955 1,991 2,088
   relative emissions (2005=100) 100 96 97 98 100 105
   implied carbon intensityb (gCO2e/MJ) 67.4 64.8 63.9 63.5 62.5 62.1
   apparent reduction in carbon intensity -- 4.0% 5.3% 5.8% 7.4% 7.9%
Upstream emissions due to imports from uncapped sources     
   Conventional productsc 116 90 94 85 85 87
   Excess from unconventionald  68 100 146 168 195 220
Normalized (relative to total, 2005=100)       
   Conventional products 5.9 4.5 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.4
   Excess from unconventional 3.4 5.0 7.3 8.5 9.8 11.1
No efficiency improvement scenario        
   Energy use, sector totale (Q/yr, HHV) 27.9 27.9 29.2 31.0 33.3 36.3
   CO2 emissionsf 1,985 1,983 2,080 2,207 2,371 2,582
      relative emissions (2005=100) 100 100 105 111 119 130
Higher vehicle efficiency only scenario       
   CO2 emissionsg 1,985 1,983 2,039 2,075 2,150 2,266
      relative emissions (2005=100) 100 100 103 105 108 114
AEO reference energy useh (Q/yr, HHV) 27.9 27.9 28.7 29.2 30.2 31.8
  Light-duty vehicles 16.8 16.8 16.5 16.4 16.6 17.1
  Medium and heavy-duty vehicles 5.0 5.1 5.8 6.1 6.5 7.2
  Air 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5
  Other 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0
Shares of sector energy use       
  Light-duty vehicles 60.3% 60.3% 57.7% 56.3% 55.0% 53.6%
  Medium and heavy-duty vehicles 17.9% 18.3% 20.3% 20.8% 21.4% 22.6%
  Air 9.8% 8.8% 9.1% 9.8% 10.5% 11.1%
  Other 12.0% 12.6% 12.9% 13.1% 13.1% 12.7%
Product and component importsi (Mbd) 2.85 2.20 2.30 2.09 2.08 2.14
   (billion gallons per year) 44 34 35 32 32 33
Notes: In general, values are from DOE's Annual Energy Outlook, using AEO'08 revised edition (EIA 2008a) for 2005 
and AEO'09 early release (EIA 2008b) for the projection years. Specific sources are as follows:  
(a) AEO Table 18 (CO2 emissions).   
(b) Computed as simple ratio of projected direct (not full fuel cycle) CO2 emissions to energy use.   
(c) Derived by applying an upstream emissions factor of 20.2 gCO2e/MJ (GREET 1.6) to the "Product and component 
imports" values described in note (i).   
(d) Derived from AEO Table 21 (International Liquids) based on a full fuel cycle emissions factor of 121 gCO2/MJ for 
heavy and unconventional resources from Farrell & Brandt (2006).  
(e) Derived from AEO Table 7 (Transportation Key Indicators) assuming that new vehicle efficiency improvements 
cease after 2010.   
(f) Computed from projected energy use (e) assuming carbon intensity fixed at 2005 value.   
(g) Computed from projected energy use (h) assuming fixed 2005 carbon intensity.   
(h) Directly from AEO Table 7 (Q = Quad = 1015 Btu = 1.0551018J).  
(i) Derived from AEO Tables 11, 21 and 127 counting only refined product and liquid fuel components imported 




Figure A-1. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector with Transportation Breakout, 2005 
 
Indust. Transp. Resid. Comm. Ag.
29% 28% 17% 17% 8%
Source:  U.S. EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2005, Tables ES-7 & 2.17  (www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html)
Values are given in teragrams (Tg = 1012g); 1 Tg = 1 million metric tons, CO2-equivalent.  
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indirect emissions (CO2 only) from electricity use
2Other includes motorcycles, pipelines, lubricants, 
mobile air conditioning and refrigeration.  
1Electric utility emissions exceed sum of allocated 
indirect emissions due to trace gases and the small 
portion of electricity used by transportation (which 











Selected Review Comments and Responses 
 
This appendix compiles particular comments on the review draft for which a specific response might 
help elucidate issues that may not have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Comments (in italics) 
are listed anonymously and may be paraphrased or combined when a similar issue was raised by 
multiple reviewers. This appendix does not list all comments, many of which were addressed in final 
revisions to the main text.  
1. Emissions inventories may or may not count biogenic carbon as a GHG emissions sink; conventional agriculture 
is not counted as a sink while afforestation can be. It seems strange for the proposed system to count agricultural 
CO2 uptake as a sink for purposes of crediting it against the biogenic emissions that occur when a fuel made from 
the agricultural product is consumed.  
If a biofuel is used to replace a fossil fuel and claim credit for a GHG reduction, then full crediting 
and debiting of associated emissions fluxes is essential. The difference between agriculture for 
biofuel and agriculture for other purposes is that in the latter case, no claim of GHG reduction is 
being made and no fossil carbon is being displaced in a manner that yields an apparent reduction of 
CO2 emissions under a cap.  
2. In the proposed FFAS system, why should a carbon uptake credit be given to a biofuel feedstock such as corn?  
No such credit is given when some of that same corn is used for feed or food. (In other words, why is such uptake 
considered additional for purposes of crediting against the cap?) 
The FFAS approach outlined here is not the same as treating biofuel use as a GHG emissions offset, 
even though it draws on some of the principles used for offsets policy. Unlike offset projects, 
biofuel and feedstock production is not treated as a circumscribed activity in an uncapped sector. 
Rather, a protocol is set up for verifiably tracing the substitution of biogenic carbon for fossil 
carbon within the commodity system and tracing associated uncapped emissions, which may occur 
in disparate locations. The FFAS system tracks absolute emissions levels, not emissions reductions, 
and so no baseline is established for which an additionality test is needed.* The displacement of land 
use from feed or food production to biofuel production, however, can cause emissions leakage, and 
the approach proposed here treats the concern as leakage rather than as an additionality problem.  
It might be possible to define a purely offsets-based policy for reconciling biofuels with a GHG cap, 
in other words, to require allowance submission for the biogenic carbon in fuel but then treat all 
biofuel suppliers strictly as offset providers subject to the customary rules proposed for GHG 
emissions offsets. Analyzing such an system and assessing whether it might be superior to the 
approach outlined here might well be a worthy topic for future work.  
3. Counting biogenic carbon together with fossil carbon just compounds accounting complexity. In most cases, biogenic 
carbon is short-cycle carbon recently absorbed from the atmosphere and so the renewability shortcut is fine.  
The renewability shortcut is technically correct for lifecycle accounting, but is poorly suited for 
defining policies that provide incentives to entities that most closely control the disparate parts of 
                                                 
* As a practical matter, some of the GHG fluxes involved in feedstock production may themselves need to be 
estimated against assumed baseline conditions (e.g., for farm field soil carbon and N2O emissions). However, the 
intent is to use location-specific measurements and modeling to estimate absolute net absolute fluxes tied to the 
feedstock for which FFAS ratings are being developed. Again, the result of the estimation is an emissions flux, not 
an emissions reduction for which an additionality concern might apply.  
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fuel lifecycle. Although it may be a convenience in modeling, it sets up a presumption of zero 
emissions that creates a high risk of incomplete or incorrect information about actual emissions for 
policy administration.  
4. Rather than basing the approach on conventional fuel equivalent carbon, why not require refiners to cover the direct 
carbon content of all transportation fuel distributed, regardless of fuel type, except to the extent its FFAS rating 
demonstrates lower net uncapped emissions?  
That would be a technically sound way to implement the general approach outlined here, and it 
would be more scientifically precise (although the difference is small). On the other hand, 
conventional fuel carbon equivalence is more exact for holding biofuel producers harmless 
competitively, so that the pricing of unrated biofuels relative to the fossil fuels they displace remains 
unchanged from what it is without a carbon cap. Either approach will accomplish the crucial goal of 
preventing the inclusion of transportation fuels in the cap from driving large emissions leakages due 
to commodity displacements tied to fuel demand. Ultimately, this question presents a policy 
judgment that will need to be worked out among stakeholders.  
5. The suggested point of regulation (POR) is further downstream than seen in cap-and-trade proposals to date, but 
most economists suggest that the best coverage is achieved by placing the POR as upstream as possible.  
It does not appear that most economists who have recommended cap-and-trade policy designs have 
looked carefully at the structure of transportation markets. Only at the point of finished fuel 
distribution is it possible to fully ascertain the characteristics of distributed fuels, which is why EPA 
has used that POR for existing fuels composition standards and why it is recommended here.  
6. The approach aspires to strictly measurement-based GHG accounting, but this seems impossible to do in practice. 
Models may still need to be used based on scientific principles and limited field data.   
This point is well taken. However, there is a big difference between circumscribed use of models, 
say, to characterize N2O emissions from a given group or farms or district, and the sweeping use of 
modeling that characterizes LCA-based regulation as seen in the EPA RFS and CARB LCFS 
regulations. LCA modeling, which attempts to address an entire pathway -- and so invites an adverse 
selection risk by relying on generic as opposed to producer-level data -- would not be used. Models 
specific for a given impact would be used to fill in data gaps, e.g., for soil-related fluxes for which 
direct measurements are limited. For example, data and modeling techniques developed in USDA's 
GRACEnet program could be used to develop best-available-resolution field-level estimates for use 
in the FFAS system. While not immune from adverse selection issues, the risk is lower because of 
both the voluntary nature of the FFAS and the inherently facility-specific policy design.  
7. Why do you claim that lifecycle analysis is not compatible with GHG emissions accounting under a carbon cap, 
and why wouldn't it in fact be better to use the complete accounting framework provided by LCA ?  
LCA fails to distinguish capped from uncapped sources and in combination with a cap would entail 
double-counting emissions from capped parts of the fuel supply chain. LCA could be used to guide 
the design of an emissions tracking system for use with a cap, but such a fuel cycle analysis would 
have to be deconstructed to separate capped from uncapped emissions, and also domestic from 
foreign emissions, in order to determine allowance requirements in a manner consistent with the 
coverage intent of cap-and-trade policy. The process of so deconstructing LCA would make it much 
like the FFAS system proposed here. Another difference is that LCA may also examine future 
impacts (as seen, for example, in EPA's proposed lifecycle scenarios for the RFS), whereas a cap 
uses "ABC" (annual basis carbon) accounting, relying on explicit banking and borrowing or market 
mechanisms for handling temporal risks.  
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Philosophically, the use of LCA to regulate fuels can be criticized as being premised on a fallacy of 
reification (or "misplaced concreteness"). That is to say, it treats an abstract construct (namely, a 
fuel's lifecycle GHG intensity) as if it were a concrete physical property (such as a fuel's chemical 
composition). For biofuels, the dominant emissions of concern occur at fields and facilities; those 
are the physical emissions that must be tracked to ensure regulatory and market transparency. GHG 
intensity is purely notional; it cannot be measured in a concrete, repeatable way as can, for example, 
regulatory limits on sulfur or other chemical and physical specifications required in fuel regulations. 
The degree of abstraction on which lifecycle GHG impact metrics are based is apparent in EPA's 
thorough and heroic proposal for LCA-based regulation in the RFS2 NPRM, which clearly 
illustrates how the results are highly dependent on numerous modeling assumptions.  
8. The low GHG intensity case in Table 1 uses an ILUC impact of 30 gCO2/MJ for corn ethanol, but this value 
is too high for the low end of the range given the extent to which the scientific community is still debating the issue.  
The uncertainties involved may be much wider than the range given here for purely illustrative 
purposes. Moreover, key aspects of the debate are not just about the magnitude of impact, but the 
degree of attribution to particular agricultural systems such as U.S. corn production. Again, the 
purpose here is not representation but rather illustration for the purpose of motivating the need for 
different policy options. That being said, EPA's proposed estimate of 60 gCO2/MJ falls roughly in 
the middle of the 30–100 gCO2/MJ illustrative range used here, and no claim is made regarding any 
statistical confidence associated with such a range.  
9. Why should ILUC emissions associated with biofuels be treated differently than upstream fossil emissions that 
also occur overseas in countries without a cap? For example, the paper states that upstream fossil emissions "might 
be best handled by mechanisms designed to address trade-related impacts, such as border adjustments or other 
policies having an ultimate goal of encouraging countries with which we trade to also adopt carbon caps." Why not 
similarly recommend for biofuels ILUC that the United States should encourage affected countries to adopt forest 
preservation programs?  
The key difference between biofuels and fossil fuels is that no one claims that the latter reduce 
GHG emissions. It is unquestionable that fossil fuel CO2 emissions, wherever they occur and unless 
recaptured and sequestered, contribute to atmospheric GHG accumulation and so they are a primary 
target of climate policy. Largely on the basis of the renewability shortcut, it has been claimed that 
biofuels reduce GHG emissions and so this claim is subject to quantitative scrutiny, including for 
leakage effects such as ILUC. In any case, most U.S. climate policy proposals do contain provisions 
to encourage forest preservation both domestically and in other countries, including targeted 
provisions for reducing tropical deforestation. Nevertheless, the point is well taken and may warrant 
further analysis of how well the approach outlined achieves a balanced treatment of biofuels and 
fossil fuels.  
10. The option of financing the Land Protection Fund (LPF) to mitigate biofuel ILUC with some form of tax on 
petroleum or petroleum allowance trades is deeply flawed. There is no reason to expect the magnitudes to match 
and worse, shifting the charge from biofuels to petroleum will aggravate the adverse impacts of biofuels.  
It is true that in economic efficiency terms, taxing petroleum to finance the LPF is ill targeted. This 
option, which is identified but not necessarily recommended among the set of options identified, 
might be a way to address the multiple national objectives in addition to climate protection that 
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